Transatlantic relations on the rocks: A conversation with Sergey Lagodinsky

Donald Trump is back in the White House and with him, a foreign policy that openly questions the sovereignty of allies, undermines democratic values, challenges European security commitments, and disrupts established trade relations. The European Union now faces a stark reality: The United States, once the guarantor of Europe’s security, prosperity, and democracy, has become its saboteur. Today’s U.S. administration not only emboldens far-right populists across Europe, but also risks hollowing out the transatlantic partnership from within. In his recent Dahrendorf Lecture, the American foreign policy thinker Robert Kagan argued that Europe is now facing an "aggressive anti-liberal power to its East (Russia) and an anti-liberal superpower to its West".

How should the EU respond to this shifting landscape? What strategic posture allows Europe to safeguard its interests while remaining anchored in the transatlantic alliance? Who are allies we can still rely on, within the U.S. administration, in Congress, or across American civil society? And how can we sustain strong transatlantic ties when they are strained at the government level?

We spoke with Sergey Lagodinsky, Member of the European Parliament and spokesperson on transatlantic relations for the Greens/EFA Group, to explore how Europe must adapt. His concept of “global integrationalism” offers a compelling alternative to Trump’s great-power, zero-sum worldview: a vision rooted in rules, partnership, and democratic resilience.

Roderick Kefferpütz: Let’s start with a broad view: Where do you see the state of transatlantic relations today?

Sergey Lagodinsky: We are definitely in a crisis. The question is whether this crisis will cause lasting damage or even destruction of our special relationship. The mistrust vis-à-vis the Trump administration is obvious. It is also absolutely natural to mistrust someone who is not reliable, like President Trump. The question is whether this mistrust will be of a broader nature and whether it will also include serious damage in the trust of American institutions and secondly to the United States as an idea.

Unfortunately, this also includes a disappointment with large parts of American society which has - for many people surprisingly, for some people not so surprisingly - a world view and a view of democracy in their country that is totally incompatible with the view that we thought the West would present.

Robert Kagan has described the Trump administration as Europe's "enemy" and that the EU is now squeezed between an "aggressive anti-liberal power to its East (Russia) and an anti-liberal superpower to its West (U.S.)". Would you agree with this description?

I don't think that categories like enemies are the right categories to choose from when talking about a country which is still an ally.

However, the ideological underpinnings and the style of this administration put us under tremendous pressure, so now we are indeed faced with pressure from both sides. 

Is this a "new normal" that we have to get used to, or can we hope that transatlantic relations will return, at some point, to what they used to be?

Never say never. But the risk that this trajectory is inevitable is real. The disappointment about how American enterprises, especially tech giants, have positioned themselves, how American elites, especially members of congress, have repeatedly missed opportunities to stand up to authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies from the White House can leave a lasting damage for the future. The most dangerous however would be a mixture between these justified feelings and culturalisation of the transatlantic crisis where the old pictures of "uncultivated Americans" would be revived and internalized by many Europeans. The fact that for many of us the support for Trump by vast parts of the population overstretches our imagination could easily lead to the revival of narratives that say that American political and societal culture have nothing in common with European culture. We should be very careful about these tendencies, also because of oversimplification.

Europe still depends on the U.S. for strategic enablers, from NATO’s military backbone to intelligence and deterrence. But parts of the U.S. administration are openly hostile to European values and questioning US security guarantees for Europe. How do we reconcile this tension?

This is of course the most fatal aspect of this crisis. Lacking mutual trust is one thing, lacking mutual trust in situations of existential danger is another one. Our overdependence on American capabilities for our survival in case of war makes us not only objectively vulnerable but also vulnerable in our mindset, because it stipulates a feeling of being blackmailed or controlled by powers that do not mean well with us.

At the same time, the dependencies are real and we will not be able to overcome them fast. My answer to this is - what I call - strategic parallelism where strategically we should do everything to keep the US in NATO and to strengthen NATO’s ability to act, also by strengthening the European flank in the alliance. We need to strategically build-up this flank so that the EU can be self-sufficient in the case of a possible US decision to leave or even abolish NATO structures. The mentioned two strategies should happen in parallel, without creating an impression that we could do without or even worse against NATO.

Trump’s “great power” view of the world includes transactionalism, threats to withdraw from NATO, and even questioning the sovereignty of allies like Canada or partners like Greenland. How should the EU respond to this kind of foreign policy posture?

I think the best answer to Trump’s transactionalism is “global integrationalism”. The EU is the only remaining major power convinced of the idea that international relations should be about reliable alliances and rule-based functioning of institutions, whether at the national, supranational or global level. In this sense, the EU offers a real alternative to the rest of the world. It is the counterproposal to Trump’s idea of confrontational deal making. European integrationalism is our answer to Trump's isolationism.

Let’s also not forget that the United States is more than the Trump administration. There are U.S. states, cities, civil society actors, businesses, and academic institutions whom we must continue to engage with and who share common values with Europe. These subnational and non-governmental actors offer important opportunities for transatlantic cooperation, especially in areas like climate action, digital regulation, or education.

At the same time, the EU has to continue to look for new alliances beyond the transatlantic framework. European strategic autonomy also means building new coalitions with like-minded democracies and emerging powers around the globe.

Your concept of European "integrationalism" is a very cogent answer to Trump's authoritarian "bend-the-knee" foreign policy. Can you elaborate on what you mean by the concept of "integrationalism", and how it might serve as a counter-strategy to Trump’s worldview?

Trump’s foreign policy tools are mainly composed of deals and coercion. His strategy aims at disrupting international cooperation and aligned structures. The tools of integrationalism work differently. We work with the promise of reliability, of joint interests that generate value for all. This is a different world view, better to say a different view on the most constructive behaviour of a leading global power and the belief in the value of long-term cooperation, shared values, and multilateralism. 

Thanks so much for the insightful interview, dear Sergey. One final question - what keeps you optimistic and hopeful these days, when it comes to the transatlantic relationship? Let's finish on a good note here.

My hope lies in American diversity. Because this country is built on the plurality of voices and perspectives, I do believe that there is an alternative to Trump's policies coming from within American society. This ability to regenerate and get back to the core values of American foundations is what gives us hope. It is however essential that the damage to our mutual trust done by this administration will not become a lasting one. All of us have to work on building bridges, even when stormy waves seem inevitable and threatening.

The views and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union.