The withdrawal of the US from Europe's defence is taking shape. The EU is now mobilising money for defence, but remains paralysed. It is time to break new ground, says MEP Sergey Lagodinsky.
If the US abandons Ukraine, it will leave the country's survival to the EU. The security of the continent will then fall definitively into European hands. This new situation presents us with a real challenge of historic proportions: it is our generation's task to bridge the defence gap between Europe's potential and its actual capacity to act. From Brussels, I see it clearly: there is a lot of discussion among governments in the EU institutions – too much. The endless debates among the 27 Member States seem out of step with the times when it comes to our security. They are good for legitimacy. They are bad for results. The moment calls for a minimum of European processes – and a maximum of determination.
We cannot afford to delay. Russia is arming itself: verbally, as I see in the Russian state media, and militarily, as our intelligence services see. They warn of growing military aggression by the Kremlin towards the EU – not at some point in the future, but in the near future. Anyone waiting for treaty changes in Brussels will be too late.
A European Security Council as a strategic decision-making centre
We need new, lean security structures alongside those we already have. At their head: a European Security Council as a strategic decision-making centre that can act quickly, legitimately and decisively.
Three structural principles will guide this: Not the whole EU. Not only the EU. Not without the EU.
‘Not the whole EU’ means that in terms of internal matters we need a core Europe for defence.
Not every EU Member State has to participate, not everyone has to agree. A Europe of different speeds is a reality – and in defence policy, it is now a necessity. It must be possible to leave individual member states behind on this journey if they lack the will or our trust. We do not have to wait for Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian leader who sympathises with Putin, if he does not want to come along. Especially not if he systematically undermines the interests of the EU.
Not the whole EU. Not only the EU. Not without the EU.
‘Not only the EU’ means that we need to open up to a coalition of the willing. Third countries such as the United Kingdom and Norway should also be involved if they are willing to pool their resources with ours. Europe's security does not end at the EU's external borders.
‘Not without the EU’ ultimately stands for maintaining links with existing EU structures. New formats must not be allowed to float in an institutional vacuum. The PESCO platform offers an ideal docking point, because interested Member States are already working together here to coordinate their defence capabilities. But so too are the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the EU Intelligence Analysis and Reporting Centre (INTCEN). This allows synergies to be exploited instead of creating new areas of competition.
But even this structure is of little use if it is not managed wisely and strongly. A strategic decision-making centre is the key to the ability to act. No defence budget, no matter how large, will bring us security if resources are not developed wisely and used in a targeted manner.
UN Security Council as a possible orientation
That is why Europe needs a Security Council that is capable of acting – not a debating forum, but a decision-making cabinet for emergencies. The United Nations showed how it can be done 80 years ago: in its heyday, the UN Security Council was able to take important decisions and show leadership. Europe could take its cue from this.
What might it look like?
The founding members should be: the President of the European Parliament as an expression of parliamentary control, the two EU Member States with the highest defence spending in absolute and relative terms, and a non-EU state with substantial contributions. However, the European Security Council should not remain static. Its members should be re-elected every two years, for example by a qualified majority of the members of the union of the willing.
Why? Because, unlike in the post-war period of the 20th century, we can no longer count on continuity in the foreign policy of European governments. It is not certain that France will still be pursuing the same defence policy in two years' time. A rotating European Security Council would strengthen Europe's ability to respond and secure its strategic direction: those who no longer wish to defend themselves jointly should be voted out if necessary.
For an effective European defence policy
The exact decision-making powers can be negotiated. In any case, the European Security Council should have the right to declare a state of defence if necessary. This statement can serve as a legal basis for national mobilisation in the Member States and their parliaments, as well as for joint defence measures. But even before that, the European Security Council and its working bodies should serve, for example, for joint procurement or coordination of joint defence and industrial initiatives.
At present, the European Union is a sleeping giant in global terms. Economically, we are second only to the United States as a market and trading power. But despite the right rhetoric, Europe remains blocked in defence policy. We have the strength, but we are not putting it on the table. An European Security Council would ensure that this strength is also effective.
This text first appeared in German on N-TV. This is a Deepl translation.
The views and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union.
