The US mid-term elections show that democratic forces can still mobilise, organise majorities and win elections. The future does not necessarily belong to the autocrats. However, the Democrats’ resounding success are no cause for relief.
There is still some good news.
A few months after the break with the Orbán regime in Hungary, the Students’ List has ousted the autocrat Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia, whilst in Brazil President Lula has won his fourth term in office and prevented a return of the Bolsonaros.
The ‘blue wave’ is a clear sign that Trump and his political project are no longer trusted in any way.
And now the United States: since 1954, there had only been two instances prior to this election where a president lost both houses of Congress in the mid-term elections. In this year’s mid-term elections, the Democrats’ success is not only clear-cut, but also overwhelming. The blue wave is a clear sign that Trump and his political project are no longer trusted in the slightest. Not only were the Democrats able to capitalise on dissatisfaction with the Trump administration, but they also won over the electorate nationwide – even in traditionally red, Republican-leaning states – with clear messages on economic and social policy issues relevant to everyday life and credible candidates. A spectacular election victory that would have been unthinkable on this scale just a few months ago.
The future does not necessarily belong to the autocrats
These are remarkable achievements. They show that democratic forces can still mobilise support. They can organise majorities. And they can win elections. The future does not necessarily belong to the autocrats.
Winning an election does not mean the job is done; in fact, that is when the real work begins.
In Serbia, the student movement faces a daunting task. It must – with politically inexperienced leaders – form a government, dismantle corrupt networks and strengthen democratic institutions. A movement that has so far thrived primarily on protest must now take on responsibility itself. That will not be easy.
The situation in Brazil is also complicated. Although Lula has retained his office, Bolsonaro’s party has expanded its power in Congress and will now form the largest parliamentary group. Lula must govern against a majority on the far right that can – and will – block his reforms, particularly in environmental and social policy. The Bolsonaros may have lost the presidency, but they are far from being politically defeated.
Nor does the Democrats’ resounding success in the mid-term elections by any means signal the end of Trump’s chaos. Yes, the Democrats can keep Trump more closely in check. They can set up committees of inquiry, block budgetary decisions and his domestic policy agenda. They can make life difficult for him.
But Trump remains president for the time being, and will do so until January 2029. Impeachment proceedings remain complicated and would, politically speaking, be more likely to give Trump’s MAGA movement a new lease of life. Instead, the Democratic majority in the US Congress must continue to work towards a shared vision for the country that goes beyond simply opposing Trump, right up until the presidential elections.
For Trump, the political battle does not end at the borders of the US
For Europe, too, the mid-term elections do not represent a respite. On the contrary. Things could get even worse. “It’s going to get worse before it gets better,” said Democratic Congressman Jason Crow at this year’s Warsaw Security Forum.
Why? Because a President Trump weakened on the domestic front could become even more problematic for Europe. Should he face increasing obstruction in Congress, he could, in turn, turn his attention more towards foreign policy in order to set the (media) political agenda. After all, the US President has significantly more leeway in that arena. There, he can announce deals, escalate conflicts, and portray himself as a great statesman. For Europe, these are not good prospects.
Further tariff threats? Quite possible. New, bombastic attacks on the European Union? Equally so. On election day itself, Trump was already lamenting once again that Greenland is US property. An uncoordinated deal with Putin, going over the heads of Ukrainians and Europeans? Not out of the question. Added to this are doubts about US security guarantees and political support for far-right parties in Europe.
Should Trump lose power at home, the temptation for him to secure political victories abroad could become all the greater.
And next year, pivotal elections are due to take place across Europe – in France, Poland, Italy, and other EU Member States. Should Trump lose power at home, the temptation for him to secure political victories abroad could become all the greater.
The mid-term elections are no cause for relief, and certainly no reason to look forward to a change of president any time soon.
The first signs are already visible. During the recent protests in France, Trump openly intervened in the domestic political debate. Flávio Bolsonaro fled to Miami following his election defeat. He thanked Trump for his support and, from US soil, portrayed himself as a victim and the ‘leader’ of Brazil. For Trump, the political battle does not end at the borders of the United States. The 2027 European elections could become the next battleground.
The mid-term elections are no cause for relief, and certainly no reason to look forward to a change of president any time soon.
And the assumption that the US of the pre-Trump era would simply return is naïve. It is therefore not a matter of simply getting through the next two years somehow. For the changes in America run deeper. They are not merely a consequence of Donald Trump. They are also structural in nature.
Europe plays hardly any role in foreign policy debates in the US
The US is focusing its strategic attention on China. It is preoccupied with its own affairs, deeply divided politically and saddled with a massive mountain of debt. Economic protectionism, too, has long since ceased to be a purely Republican issue. Anyone who believes that a Democratic president would abolish all tariffs against Europe might be in for a disappointment. These tariffs generate significant revenue. Moreover, they have long since become an instrument of US industrial policy. Nor is it a foregone conclusion that a Democratic administration would invest more in European security.
Furthermore, the Democrats have so far failed to develop a coherent strategy for Europe, as the party is at odds with itself. Traditional internationalists wish to strengthen US leadership and NATO. A younger generation, on the other hand, is increasingly questioning the US’s global role. The new isolationism in the country is even spreading to the Democratic camp. Europe has so far played hardly any role in these debates.
Democratic forces in Europe should therefore abandon the notion that the return of a Democratic president to the White House automatically means a return to the old transatlantic order.
So what should be done?
Europe must become more capable of taking action
Firstly, Europe must consistently continue on its chosen path towards greater strategic sovereignty, regardless of who is in power in the US. The European Union must become more capable of taking action in its own right. The latest edition of the representative long-term study ‘European by Default’, which examines citizens’ expectations of German policy towards Europe, shows that: There is public support for this course of action.
Secondly, we in Europe must engage more intensively with the political future of the US from today onwards. Transatlantic relations must not be limited to the White House alone. We should invest even more heavily in dialogue with the various levels of government, across party lines – with Congress, governors, states and cities. With businesses, universities and civil society. And as long as the Democrats do not yet have a shared vision of what transatlantic and global relations should look like in future, we should proactively reach out to them and put forward our own ideas. Early on, and with concrete proposals.
The two go hand in hand: European autonomy and political investment in transatlantic relations at various levels. One must not come at the expense of the other.
Europe’s ability to act depends, above all, on Europe itself.
For Europe is under enormous pressure and must take a stronger stand on key issues than it has done so far. The democratic forces in Serbia need support. Ukraine continues to fight for its own future and that of Europe. And with numerous elections due to take place next year – particularly in France, Poland, and Italy – decisive political contests are also on the horizon within the EU, which require the attention of all Europeans.
The results of the mid-term elections are very good news for US democracy, which, thanks to the efforts of many stakeholders, has withstood a major test. The changed political landscape at state level provides an important foundation for ensuring that democratic rules are upheld in the next presidential election.
Yet none of this resolves any of the strategic problems currently facing Europe. Even today, the challenges are not getting any smaller and time is running out. Europe’s ability to act depends, above all, on Europe itself.
This piece was first published in German on boell.de.