Something old, something new…and something missing

Cheap talk?

Ahead of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s 2026 State of the Union speech (SOTEU), observers levelled the old “talk is cheap” charge. And yet, despite this scepticism towards the consequentiality of political rhetoric, the speech was followed by a flurry of analyses: 5 takeaways, 10 takeaways, 12 takeaways. That’s because a speech like that is not just words; it’s a window into von der Leyen’s thinking. What then does the State of the Union tell us about the EU’s foreign and security policy?

Von der Leyen’s diagnosis of the status quo is dark. She describes a “fracture in the international rules-based system” resulting in an “openly hostile world”. Given that, she says: “our doctrine, our institutions and our decision-making have not kept pace with [this] new reality.” Her remedy: a European Security Council, a European Security Strategy, and the offer of “associate membership” for Canada. 

While welcome, these measures are largely adaptive. Taken together, they reveal what’s missing: A European agenda for shaping the international order, rather than just adapting to its changes. At a time of competing visions of order, adaptation alone is not enough.

Let’s take a closer look.

Something old: European Security Council

First, the European Security Council. This proposal resurfaces regularly. In 2017, Emmanuel Macron pushed the idea on the campaign trail, and Chancellor Angela Merkel picked it up the following year. More recently, it has been promoted by EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and particularly MEP Sergey Lagodinsky, who even developed a legal blueprint.

Now, von der Leyen is joining the debate. The immediate response from member states was: not another meeting. That response, however, is disingenuous given that it is up to the member states to elevate an ESC from talk shop to cockpit. There’s a reason why there’s no ESC yet despite an undisputed need for updated decision-making processes in the realm of foreign and security policy. The list of open questions and obstacles is long and well documented starting with opposition from member states, to treaty provisions, to unresolved relations with NATO, etc. Von der Leyen says, she wants to make the European Security Council “a reality”. She does not say how.

Something borrowed: European Security Strategy

Next, the European Security Strategy is mostly a recycled proposal. Von der Leyen had first announced it in January 2026. But its arrival keeps getting pushed back, not least because EU member states insisted on publishing a comprehensive threat assessment prior to the strategy’s drafting.

EU institutions remain locked in a competition over who shapes European foreign and security policy. Von der Leyen did mention the High Representative Kaja Kallas in her speech even though von der Leyen’s team has reportedly side-lined the EEAS in the conception of the new strategy. But that’s politics.

When it comes to policy, von der Leyen highlighted the need for a European “counter-hybrid playbook” and “Emergency Security Protocol”. Borrowing from NATO, she likened the latter to NATO’s Article 4. Both would strengthen the EU’s ability to coordinate a common response to hybrid attacks, such as the drone incident in Leipzig. 

This “borrowing” does raise questions, however. Given NATO’s existing Article 4 mechanism, critics have warned against duplicating structures. But an EU mechanism could bring something different to the table. From visa bans to trade sanctions and economic security measures, the EU has a broader toolbox below the military threshold to respond to hybrid attacks. 

Something new: Associate membership / Alliance for the Future

Now, the proposal of “associate membership” for Canada is new. There is no precedent, no blueprint. And in that it’s daring. European Parliament President Roberta Metsola was quick to add Australia and New Zealand as other potential candidates for associate membership. Yet the immediate response from member states was, once again, skepticism. Apparently, neither the member states, nor the wider Commission were consulted before. Some might say it’s the only way to get the idea off the ground. 

But the proof will be in the pudding. For now, associate membership is little more than a buzzword, alongside “Alliance for the Future”. The latter is largely Ottawa’s wording. Already at the 2025 EU-Canada summit, Ottawa insisted on calling the relationship a “Partnership of the Future”, successfully inserting this framing into the summit annex, while the EU kept to its classic “strategic partnership agreement” format.

Whether you call it associate membership or Alliance for the Future, the semantic proliferation illustrates the fundamental tension: there is great momentum for a deeper EU-Canada relationship, but there are also plenty of differences to overcome. National interests are complex, and not always overlapping. The Arctic is one case in point; always mentioned as an area of cooperation, yet conspicuously absent in the EU-Canada Security and Defence Partnership and the 2025 summit statement.

It is also telling that Prime Minister Mark Carney has, in fact, been the main driver of closer EU-Canada relations. In his speech the day after von der Leyen’s, it was Carney who went on to define what the “Alliance for the Future” partnership could actually entail. 

Something missing: Shaping open futures

And in so doing, Carney inadvertently accentuated the fundamental gap in von der Leyen’s State of the Union: The EU doesn’t know what it wants.

Von der Leyen aptly describes the changing international order but formulates no strategy for shaping it. Earlier this year, she caused a stir when she said: “Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order.” In her SOTEU, she doubled-down saying: “we can no longer rely on [the rules-based system] as the only way to secure our interests.” And yet, rules do help protect European interests and rules are also a source of power. Think global standard setting. The future is not just about “defending rules” (von der Leyen), but about setting new ones. China wants a new world order, so does US-President Donald Trump. Canada wants a new order centring on middle-powers. 

But what does Europe want?

Associate membership, European Security Council – von der Leyen risks producing a new vocabulary for a changing world faster than producing a strategy to fill the buzzwords with life. 

The speech included no vision for future order. This is the European paradox. The EU is one of the few actors in the world with the capacities and capabilities to contribute to the shaping of the world, yet it lacks the vision and confidence to do so. That lack of ambition was on display within the College of Commissioners. When the idea was raised to bring all the EU’s economic and trade partners together for a summit in Brussels to showcase support for the rules-based economic order, the response was silence. Canada constitutes almost the mirror image. Under Mark Carney, it has articulated a vision for the future and shown the confidence to pursue it – but lacks the capabilities. 

Von der Leyen kicked off her speech with the Dickens’ quote: “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.” She, then, proceeded to describe “the worst of times”, yet did not back up the opposite claim. These days, international rules and roles are being renegotiated. So, there is a case to be made that this actually is the best of times to shape future order. There was a kernel of this sentiment in the speech when von der Leyen said: “nothing is inevitable”. “Europe has the power to act. It is we who decide our rules, not big tech.” That spirit, evident in the realm of digital policy, is needed in European foreign and security policy. It is time to recapture a sense of European self-efficacy on the global stage.