Dossier

Drowning in disinformation

How homegrown state-sponsored disinformation threatens EU democracy

Disinformation can potentially reach a vast audience, largely due to social networks’ recommendation algorithms. Discussions on disinformation in the EU often focus on external state actors such as Russia and China, or on conspiracy theorists and hate groups. Domestic sources of disinformation such as political parties and national governments, however, are often overlooked. Increasingly centralised state-media empires, threaten European media pluralism, as do attacks against independent media. A resilient democracy needs a free flow of information and multiple competing narratives, and therefore it is imperative to address trends contrary to this principle.

With a mosaic of insights from civil society actors in different EU Member States we will shed light on various facets of the phenomenon of state-sponsored disinformation emanating from within the EU itself. Our goal is to encourage debate and offer concrete ideas about addressing the problem, particularly considering the updated EU Code of Practice on Disinformation and the Digital Services Act. Disinformation has the power to promote negative narratives about certain groups and civil society in general. It discredits the work of NGOs and academia, who are frequently targets for online attacks and campaigns that spread false information.

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Spreading propaganda and disinformation using public funds

E-paper
This e-paper examines systemic failures in curbing the funding of hateful content as well as disinformation and misinformation with the public money of Slovenian taxpayers. At the same time, it describes the very effective yet opaque methods of circumventing the co-regulative measures proposed by the EU Digital Services Act, which tries to curb such practices.
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What to do with the EU’s internal subversives

Commentary
Disinformation and misinformation thrive in uncertainty and secrecy. While growing awareness within the European Union of the threat posed by malign disinformation campaigns to undermine support for democratic values, and the EU project as a whole, has elicited a number of robust responses, these have mostly targeted external actors. Addressing threats from within Member States poses a more acute challenge, one that will require great thoughtfulness and delicacy to resolve, and require a unanimous collective effort.
By Joanna Rohozińska

Expert commentaries

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Policies and measures to counter disinformation in Germany: the power of informational communities

Commentary
Disinformation has become a regular plague of democratic elections. Is regulation able to tackle this problem? How promising are other initiatives by civil society and industry actors? What should be the role of the state in a new media and information order? And how do people decide what to believe or not? A diversity of information and a plurality of communities are essential to rebuild trust in public communication.
By Judit Bayer
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Inside your pocket: the grave threat of disinformation on private messenger apps

Commentary
WhatsApp is huge in Spain. It is on almost every phone and Spaniards spend more time on this platform than in any other digital space. Telegram is also growing massively, yet the fundamental role these private messaging apps play in the dissemination of disinformation has often been overlooked. It is there where most disinformation originates and, at the same time, where it is most difficult to monitor.
By Carlos Hernández-Echevarría
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Disinformation in Hungary: From fabricated news to discriminatory legislation

Commentary
Recently, the Hungarian ruling party and its media empire launched a massive campaign against independent policy analysts and opposition parties, accusing them of spreading anti-vaccination views. These campaigns follow a typical method of operation: they start from a single piece of information and end in some sort of discriminatory legislation against independent voices.
By Patrik Szicherle and Péter Krekó

Related content

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Reducing disinformation and hate in election campaigns: how can we detox the debating culture?

Analysis
The German parliamentary election campaign played out on the internet as never before. In the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, this was certainly necessary, but it brought with it all the evils we have previously seen in US election campaigns: disinformation campaigns and hate speech were used to discredit candidates, paid political online advertising and foreign influence circumvented basic democratic values. As a woman, Annalena Baerbock the Greens' candidate for Chancellor, was particularly affected. The elections have shown that what we need, in Germany and the EU, are better media skills for the population and clear rules for communication platforms.
By Vérane Meyer and Zora Siebert
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Gendered disinformation: 6 reasons why liberal democracies need to respond to this threat

Policy brief
Gendered disinformation is a form of identity-based disinformation that threatens human rights worldwide. It undermines the digital and political rights, as well as the safety and security, of its targets. Ellen Judson from Demos explains what gendered disinformation is, how it impacts individuals and societies, and the challenges in combating it, drawing on case studies from Poland and the UK. It assesses how the UK and EU are responding to gendered disinformation, and sets out a plan of action for governments, platforms, media and civil society.
By Ellen Judson

Related events

Infodemic

Countering the coronavirus infodemic

Event recording
The need for reliable information about Covid-19 is vital. Unfortunately, many false stories and myths are circulating about it. External state actors, domestic conspiracy theorists and hate groups as well as even some governments participate in spreading such disinformation. Numerous myths reach a huge audience on social networks because of the network’s recommendation algorithms. Where do we draw the line between opinion and fabrication? Where do the fake stories come from, how do they spread and what is their purpose? Most importantly: what can we do about this?

Contact

If you are a civil society actor facing state-sponsored disinformation, please get in touch with us! 📧

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