Brazil votes: Where is the divided country heading?

On Sunday 4 October, around 156 million Brazilians will elect a new head of state. Citizens will not only be deciding on the offices of president and vice-president: they will also be electing 27 governors and their deputies, the entire Chamber of Deputies, two-thirds of the Senate, and the members of the state legislatures. The presidential run-off will take place on 25 October. 

A total of twelve candidates are standing for the presidency. However, the decision will be made in the second round between the incumbent President Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of the convicted former President Jair Bolsonaro. These two politicians epitomise the deep divides that not only split Brazil but also characterise the whole of Latin America: the far-right and pro-American camp versus the social-democratic camp with its focus on the Global South. Although polls show that the majority of the Brazilian population wants an end to polarisation, it has not been possible to put forward a moderate conservative alternative.

Which issues are dominating the election campaign?

Internal security and the fight against crime are at the heart of the debates. Voters are also concerned about future relations with the US and differing interpretations of patriotism.  Furthermore, a complex corruption crisis at the Supreme Federal Court (STF) is casting a shadow over the election campaign. The allegations also target Alexandre de Moraes – the very judge who is regarded as a symbol of democratic resilience and who put the masterminds behind the attempted coup of 8 January 2023 behind bars. This could also cost Lula crucial percentage points. 

Economic issues, by contrast, are playing hardly any role. Whilst the Brazilian economy is producing solid figures, the current government has failed to capitalise politically on these successes.

What might potentially change in the coming parliamentary term?

Lula da Silva’s advanced age (80) highlights how urgently the Brazilian left needs to modernise and usher in a generational change. The country therefore faces a truly pivotal election in 2030. Until then, the current crisis of confidence in the Supreme Federal Court (STF) threatens a key pillar of democracy, whilst the countless contradictions and the lack of fundamental debates are weakening the Workers’ Party (PT) from within.

Within federal politics, policy shifts are likely to be less significant than hoped for. The composition of Congress is unlikely to change much. The divisions run along familiar lines of conflict: unchecked versus controlled exploitation of natural resources; radical versus gradual disenfranchisement of Indigenous peoples and Quilombolas (descendants of escaped enslaved people), particularly in relation to mining projects with global implications; intensified versus reduced discrimination against minorities and poorer sections of the population; and the dismantling of social policy versus attempts to further strengthen the rule of law.

Significantly more noticeable changes are to be expected in foreign policy. Here, different approaches clash: a self-assured foreign policy versus a more submissive one. On the one hand, the aim is to play an active role in shaping the policies of the Global South in forums such as the G20, BRICS and UN Climate Conferences (COPs). On the other hand, there is a risk of subordination to US claims of hegemony in Latin America – for example, within the framework of the US security initiative ‘Shields of the Americas’. As a result, Brazil might fall silent on the regional and global stage.

The victory of a far-right federal government threatens to put civil society and progressive forces under immense pressure. An existing ‘agents’ law’ – similar to legislation in other countries in the region – could be implemented swiftly. This would cut off foreign funding and restrict the scope for action of progressive actors. Only time will tell to what extent global networks of democratic actors can mitigate this development.

What does this mean for Brazil, the region and Europe?

In Brazil, entrenched power structures continue to shape developments. Interest-driven networks block genuine change. To illustrate: around 20 per cent of the national budget flows directly through MPs and senators to their constituencies, serving clientelist interests. This mechanism is controlled by the so-called Centrão – a conservative coalition of around eight parties with shifting alliances, in which agribusiness is strongly represented. The crucial question is: how much longer will this Centrão coalition be able to withstand the pressure from the far right and the encroaching organised crime? 

There is a great deal at stake, both regionally and globally. Brazil is one of the last countries in the region not to be governed by a right-wing government. A victory for Flávio Bolsonaro would completely shift the balance of power: the region would come under US influence almost in its entirety. This would see the Monroe Doctrine implemented in a new form (Donroe) and the ‘Shield of the Americas’ security alliance activated. In terms of foreign policy, Latin America would lose its voice in global forums such as BRICS or the G20. Instead, authoritarian governments would dominate the scene. For the European Union, a change in power would have serious consequences: it would lose an important partner on key issues such as trade and climate policy, as well as on initiatives to reshape the global order.

This election is also about addressing the inequality gap

Much of the debate is also reminiscent of Germany – above all the call for a strong, stable centre. To counter the Lula-Bolsonaro polarisation in the near future, democratic political forces must reposition themselves, together with civil society. Members of both houses of Congress also have a role to play. They wield enormous power and must fulfil their legislative responsibilities in order to safeguard the balance of power within the state. Why is this so difficult?

At its core, this election is also about addressing the inequality gap: the top one per cent of the population earns ten times as much as the average; estates of over 1,000 hectares continue to account for 45 per cent of the total agricultural land – and it is precisely these large landowners who make up over 80 per cent of the members of Congress (449 out of 513). 

These figures illustrate how far we still have to go to achieve genuine representation of the ‘political centre’, if by that we mean the centre and the majority of society. Lula da Silva stands for the fight against poverty and hunger and thus aims to pursue policies for broad sections of the population who, however, have hardly any voice in Congress. This closes the vicious circle of Brazilian democracy: a parliamentary majority that governs without regard for the interests of a large part of the population.