Cambodia’s perspective on global power shifts and the role of the European Union

Cambodia, as a small state in Southeast Asia, is currently navigating one of the most complex geopolitical landscapes in modern history. The nation faces an array of vulnerabilities and risks stemming from intensifying geopolitical competition, primarily between the United States and China, and existential security threats by a bigger neighbour.

The key challenge for Phnom Penh is to formulate a proactive and resilient foreign policy that safeguards territorial integrity and national sovereignty amid the emergence of a multiplex world order. 

The evolving multiplex world order and Cambodia’s vulnerability

The world order is undergoing a rapid structural transformation, marking the end of the unipolar hegemonic order and the definitive emergence of a ‘multiplex world’. This transition is characterized by four defining features: the absence of a single hegemon, complex interdependence beyond traditional economic ties (now including climate, digital governance and security), a multi-level governance architecture, and a plurality of norms and pathways to modernity (Amitav et al. 2024).

Geopolitical competition and reglobalisation

From the Cambodian perspective, the power shift is most visible in the horizontal shift from the West to the East, specifically the rise of China and the relative decline of the US in parts of the Asia-Pacific. China is often viewed by developing countries, including Cambodia, as an opportunity for market access, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), capital and technology transfer. Conversely, the US’s adoption of protectionist measures and a transactional foreign policy stance have weakened its international standing.

The current global rivalry has accelerated a trend towards reglobalisation rather than deglobalization. This is not a retreat from global integration but a reorganization characterized among others by:

• ‘Friend-shoring’ and ‘near-shoring’: Global trade patterns are reconfigured toward politically aligned partners, as supply chains shift from ‘just-in-time’ to ‘just-in-case’ resilience, treating connectivity and logistics as geopolitical assets (McKinsey Global Institute 2025).
• Financial geopolitics: Decisions on reserve currencies are increasingly driven by geopolitical alignment, as countries diversify strategic partnerships and currencies to reduce structural vulnerability (Gopinath 2024).

The small state’s sovereignty and resilience

For small states like Cambodia, this multiplex order presents a dual challenge: immense opportunity for diversification alongside acute structural vulnerabilities. The experience of historical armed conflict, such as the recent aggression by Thailand, underscores the permanent need for small states to find mechanisms to protect their territorial integrity and sovereignty against powerful neighbours. 

In an order defined by structural vulnerability, national resilience is the ultimate hedge. For Cambodia, this means the synergistic combination of economic security, a credible defence system, internal institutional strength and the robust pursuit of external support through active multilateralism and the unwavering defence of international law are critical to securing the nation’s future.

In a multiplex world, the agency of a small state is maintained through:

• Networked diplomacy and multilateralism: Actively participating in regional and international forums to cultivate partnerships and promote common principles.
• International law: Utilizing the legal framework of the United Nations Charter and international conventions as a shield against coercion.
• National capability building: Investing in national strength and resilience – economic, technological and defence – to mitigate external shocks and pressure.

The influence of even a weakening hegemon, such as the US, is exerted through structural power embedded in global networks (Matala and Stutz 2025), which can impose substantial costs via direct bilateral pressure or restrictions on market access. The US’s reciprocal tariff is case in point here. Cambodia’s challenge is to actively mitigate these vulnerabilities by seeking diverse, stable and predictable external partners. 

The influence of a growing regional power, such as China, is exerted through many dimensions of direct bilateral relations, which for Cambodia means that ‘multiplexity’ also entails the need to manage increasing asymmetries while maximizing its domestic authority and legitimacy (Chheang 2021).

The EU's geopolitical challenge and the need for an assertive role 

Global politics is currently characterized by the erosion of the rules-based international order and the waning influence of its liberal proponents. This places a significant burden on the remaining normative powers, particularly the EU. However, the EU is currently grappling with its own internal and external pressures.

Brussels’ geopolitical awakening and internal coherence

Driven by the erosion of the liberal international order and Russia’s war on Ukraine, intensifying China–US competition, and the rising influence of China, the EU has experienced a geopolitical awakening. This shift is marked by aspirations regarding strategic autonomy, strengthening geo-economic defence (e.g. sanctions, de-risking) and launching the Global Gateway initiative.

• Institutional shift: The European Commission has evolved into a strategic geo-economic actor, focusing on economic security and the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), a regulatory framework designed to protect the EU and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries, enabling a structured response to coercive measures.  Moreover, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has hardened its mandate, reflected in the Strategic Compass medium-term security and defence strategy.
• Internal impediments: The persistent lack of a common vision, consensus and unity, exacerbated by the rise of the extreme right in Europe, remains the greatest structural vulnerability. This lack of coherence risks weakening the EU’s agency and credibility on the global stage. Therefore, it is important to introduce a qualified majority voting system when the Council of the EU votes on a proposal by the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 

EU’s mixed policy signals

The EU’s current policy signals are a mixed bag: reassuring in their strategic clarity (Indo-Pacific Strategy, and the Strategic Compass – an action plan that establishes a common strategic vision and concrete objectives to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030) but problematic in their implementation and external perception.

• Reassuring intent: The EU commits to a rules-based, principle-based external engagement, promoting open and inclusive multilateralism. Initiatives like Global Gateway, with their emphasis on transparency and sustainability, confirm the EU’s identity as a values-driven alternative to purely transactional models.
• Problematic perception (‘Green Protectionism’): EU initiatives within the Green Deal, notably the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the Deforestation-Free Products Regulation (EUDR), are often perceived in the Global South and Southeast Asia as unilateral, Eurocentric trade barriers. This perception is created when high regulatory costs are imposed without adequate technical assistance or consultation, damaging the spirit of equal partnership the EU claims to champion.

The mandate for assertiveness

To overcome this gap between ambition and reality, Cambodia expects the EU to be consistent and firm in upholding its core values. The EU must transition from a reactive defence of the status quo to an assertive posture. This requires:

• Being a proactive system stabilizer: Assuming the role of a stabilizing anchor for the global economic system by actively setting norms in emerging domains (e.g. AI, space governance).
• Integrated military capacity: Moving towards establishing a credible, stand-alone military capacity. Without the ability to enforce its interests, the EU remains a geopolitical object, not a subject.
• Becoming an anchor institution: Becoming the undisputed anchor for a coalition of the willing, offering financial, economic and security lifelines that truly compete with rival offers and provide a credible alternative to sphere-of-influence politics.

ASEAN–EU partnership

The partnership between ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the European Union is a critical component of navigating the multiplex world. As the world’s two most advanced and institutionalized regional integration frameworks, they are natural partners in defending rules-based multilateralism and promoting regional stability.

Shared principles and strategic weight

The foundation of the ASEAN–EU partnership rests on three shared principles:

1. Commitment to an open, rules-based international order.
2. Belief in regional integration as a pathway to peace and development.
3. Reliance on dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes.

The partnership’s economic scale reinforces its strategic weight: together, they account for approximately 20% of global GDP and are significant trade and investment partners (EEAS 2025). The EU is ASEAN’s second-largest source of FDI.

ASEAN–EU cooperation as a strategic hedge

For small and medium-sized states in ASEAN, including Cambodia, cooperation with the EU functions as a strategic hedge.

• Diversification: It diversifies economic and technological partnerships, reducing overreliance on any single major power.
• Strategic autonomy: ASEAN and the EU can leverage the partnership to avoid overly exclusive alignments, particularly in sensitive areas like technological supply chains.
• Strengthening the system: A unified ASEAN and EU response offers a more effective path to strengthening the multilateral system and modernizing international rules to address new geopolitical and technological realities.

ASEAN and the EU can jointly safeguard the rules-based international order and advance multilateralism, especially given their shared commitment to these principles as formalized in their Strategic Partnership since 2020. As the world’s two most advanced regional integration organizations, their collaboration offers a powerful, non-hegemonic anchor for stability. 

The Cambodia–EU partnership: a path to shared prosperity

Despite the increasingly close ties to Beijing, Cambodia’s foreign policy is guided by principles of non-alignment, permanent neutrality and the active promotion of open and inclusive multilateralism. Neutrality, for Cambodia, is not passive but an active stance: engaging in international platforms to promote principle-based diplomacy, cooperation and international law.

EU’s role in Cambodia’s development trajectory

The EU remains a critical partner for Cambodia’s socio-economic development, governance, democracy and human rights promotion. The relationship is highly valued by Phnom Penh, as Deputy Prime Minister SOK Chenda Sophea reiterated, citing constantly deepening political mutual trust and expanding joint cooperation.

• Economic importance: The EU is Cambodia's 4th largest trading partner, accounting for 9.6% of its total trade in goods. The ongoing EU–Cambodia Business Partnership initiative further supports small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to enhance processing, sustainability and export capacities, with a focus on Least Developed Country (LDC) graduation.
• LDC graduation: Prime Minister Hun Manet has voiced hope that the EU will remain a strong partner as Cambodia prepares to graduate from LDC status by 2029.
• Sustainable development: Cambodia has committed to ambitious goals, aiming for 70% renewable energy by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2050. Despite being a low emitter, this commitment aligns with the EU’s Green Deal agenda and opens a major avenue for deep cooperation.

Policy recommendations for enhanced EU–Cambodia engagement

For the partnership to reach its full potential and for the EU to maximize its strategic relevance to Cambodia, the following actions are crucial.

Conclusion

The emerging multiplex world presents both peril and potential for small states. Cambodia’s challenge to protect its sovereignty and pursue national development in the shadow of great power rivalry necessitates a robust policy of active, non-aligned engagement and diversification. A hedging strategy has become the core of Cambodia’s foreign policy in order to navigate such an increasingly complex, volatile and dangerous world. 

The EU, in turn, needs to transition from a rhetorical to a material geopolitical power – one that champions and asserts legal principles and consistently backs its values with resources. For Brussels, the reminder is clear: the core interest of the Global South is not ‘choosing a side’ but securing development and stability. The EU’s effectiveness will be judged not by the ambition of its strategies, but by the consistency and tangible impact of its delivery on the ground.

By enhancing its partnership with Cambodia through tailored economic support, a predictable transition framework for LDC graduation and values-based investments via Global Gateway, the EU can secure a crucial, stable partner in the heart of Southeast Asia. This partnership is not merely a charitable gesture; it is a strategic imperative for the EU (and for Cambodia) to defend the rules-based order, maintain its economic prosperity and strengthen its normative influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Cambodia, for its part, should proactively engage the EU both bilaterally and through multilateral platforms – particularly under the ASEAN–EU partnership framework – to broaden and deepen cooperation in upholding a rules-based international order, advancing open and inclusive multilateralism, and enhancing people-centred governance and international cooperation to address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges. 

The views and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union | Global Dialogue. 

This text builds on discussions held by the “Expert Delegation on Global Power Shifts” (funded by Heinrich-Böll-Foundation). With a focus on geopolitics, China and the role of the EU, the week-long event took place in Brussels in the early summer of 2025. It brought together academics and practitioners from the foundation’s global network.

References

Amitav, A., Estevadeordal, A. & Goodman, L. W. (2024). What is a multiplex world? Medium. https://medium.com/international-affairs-blog/what-is-a-multiplex-world-order-d942af3d2b45

Chheang, Vannarith. “Cambodia’s Embrace of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Managing Asymmetries, Maximizing Authority”. Asian Perspective, vol. 45 no. 2, 2021, p. 375-396. Project MUSE, https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/apr.2021.0005

European External Action Service. (2025). The European Union and ASEAN. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/asean/european-union-and-asean_en

Gopinath, G. (2024). Geopolitics, global trade, and the dollar. International Monetary Fund.

McKinsey Global Institute. (2025). Global trade outlook. https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/economic-conditions-outlook

Matala, S. & Stutz, C. (2025). “When great powers struggle: How geopolitical alignments of small states are influenced by their MNEs”. Journal of Management Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.13254