As part of an EU Democracy research project funded by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union office, Sophie Pornschlegel interviewed European Commission Vice-President for Values and Transparency, Věra Jourová, during the summer break of the European Commission. In their conversation, Vice-President Jourová reflected on five years of efforts to safeguard democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the EU, amid increasing threats against democracy and a shifting geopolitical context, not least due to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
![Věra Jourová & Sophie Pornschlegel vera-jourova-sophie-pornschlegel.png](/sites/default/files/styles/var_desktop/public/2024-08/vera-jourova-sophie-pornschlegel.png.jpg?itok=9cjDkTaO)
Thank you for accepting this interview, Mrs. Vice-President. Back in 2019, when the last Commission’s mandate started: What was the initial thinking behind President Ursula von der Leyen’s decision to establish democracy as one of the six priorities for the European Commission?
In 2019, we still lived with the conviction that democracy cannot be seriously endangered. There was not the same sense of urgency that we have today.
But the threats kept increasing: the discrimination of minorities; the rise of hate speech and disinformation; and the rule of law backsliding in several Member States. The Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine reinforced these tendencies and became real stress tests for democracy. A growing percentage of the population feels that democracy does not work for them anymore.
The big difference between 2014 and 2019 is that the Commission understood that it had to act. Ursula von der Leyen came to the conclusion that the defense of democracy must be one of her six priorities; and that it should have concrete measures attached to it, as well as a responsible Commissioner. That was also a choice between being popular and being principled: working on the democracy agenda means you produce very powerful enemies – not just adversaries. Between 2019 and 2024, the level of urgency increased even more – this is why we need to continue the work that we started.
In 2019, we still lived with the conviction that democracy cannot be seriously endangered. There was not the same sense of urgency that we have today.
Looking back at the work you did in the past five years: Could you share your approach, highlight successful initiatives and lessons learned during this mandate?
We realised that democracy itself cannot “do the magic” and protect itself. So we started to work on three pillars I call the “Holly Trinity”, which were tightly interconnected: democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights. At the time, I was under pressure from the European Parliament to do an Annual Report covering all three. I didn't want to do it because it would have been just another heavy vehicle, overloaded and too general. I designed three work packages with concrete measures.
First, we launched the Annual Rule of Law Report, covering all 27 Member States, watching the trends and starting an early dialogue. The second was the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP), with concrete measures to protect free and fair elections; a more effective fight against disinformation; and strengthening the media. Finally, the third pillar is fundamental rights, where we did many different actions, such as the strategy for LGBTQI, for the Roma, and against antisemitism.
We neglected one aspect: our understanding of Russia. While fortunately people know what Auschwitz means, not many know what Kolyma means (a Stalinist gulag in Siberia). This underestimation proved very dangerous when Russia started the war in Ukraine. It was the moment for the Easterners to tell the Westerners: “Look, we know what Putin plans”.
We realised that democracy itself cannot “do the magic” and protect itself. So we started to work on three pillars I call the “Holly Trinity”, which were tightly interconnected: democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights.
What were the biggest challenges for the European Commission, knowing that certain competencies are at the national level? What were the most difficult topics and files to move forward with, and why?
The competencies in the field of democracy are quite blurred. If you want to make progress, you have to permanently seek agreement with the Member States and to consult stakeholders, who can make the difference.
There are also other institutions that helped move forward the agenda. For instance, the European Court of Justice enriched us with several cases, which allowed us to better define Article 2 TEU, the article defining EU values like democracy and the rule of law. The lack of precise definition beforehand weakened my power at the beginning of this mandate, because several national actors asked me: “How do you define Article 2?” And I had to admit that I had no clear definition. And it was the same with Article 19 TEU on judicial independence.
Our competencies are quite strong on technologies and innovations, which should serve people’s individual rights and strengthen the public sphere. The new Artificial Intelligence Act, the Digital Services Act, the regulation on political advertising and the European Media Freedom Act give a proper regulatory framework to new technologies and innovations, ensuring that they don’t turn against people and democracy. And the Member States really supported the European Commission, as they knew that individually they were not big enough to tame the big tech companies.
Does the European Commission have sufficient power to protect democracy in areas such as electoral security and corruption? Should the European Commission have more authority there?
I think the current legal set-up for the Commission is sufficient. What I would like to see more of is funding of media literacy and digital education; there is a real lack of understanding of our recent history, which could lead to a possible repetition of the worst things. Our issues are getting bigger, and the budget is getting smaller for supporting the “brains and hearts” of Europeans. We need “smart” funding, without indoctrination, and more critical thinking, more support for citizens to deal with the avalanche of information, the ability to distinguish between true and false.
Let’s revisit the rule of law agenda. The relations with Hungary and Poland were challenging, and there are growing concerns about Italy. How well were you able to work with Member States on the democracy agenda? Did larger Member States like France and Germany support you?
My office is unpleasant for many Member States. It's not just Poland and Hungary. Poland and Hungary helped me understand that we had to do the Annual Rule of Law Report every year, mapping all the Member States to detect the dangerous trends early on. Democracy is a very demanding governance system, which requires limitations and separation of power. In times of crisis, many decision-makers would like to reach for more executive power, to curtail checks and balances, the powers of the judiciary, academia, civil society, and impartial state administration. But that is not how it works – you have to govern, not just to lead.
Many times decision-makers told me that the Commission should not meddle with their own agenda, while others were asking for us to step in and help. The Commission needs to be very aware of its own power. It is a permanent search for an equilibrium. Overall, we are now in a rather good place with Member States. The Annual Rule of Law Report allowed us to structure the dialogue with a clear methodological assessment. Everybody engages with it, even if they have different views on our assessment.
In times of crisis, many decision-makers would like to reach for more executive power, to curtail checks and balances, the powers of the judiciary, academia, civil society, and impartial state administration. But that is not how it works – you have to govern, not just to lead.
Let’s discuss the relations between the European Commission and the EU Council. Recent EU Council Presidencies have been very reluctant to discuss rule of law issues, fearing it might stifle cooperation in other areas, for instance on foreign policy. How are your relations with the EU Council?
Article 7 (the suspension of voting rights in the EU Council) and article 50 TEU (the article which enables a country to leave the EU) were two articles we thought would never be triggered. Article 7 was even referred to as the “atomic bomb”. I say it's neither atomic, nor a bomb, because it starts a process, which is fully in the hands of the Member states in the EU Council. For them this is unpopular, unpleasant, and an embarrassing moment to criticise their peers. Poland’s procedure has been closed. On Hungary, the Member States are more courageous because they really don't like what Viktor Orbán is doing in the context of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Under the Belgian EU Council Presidency, there was a hearing on Hungary. And it will be interesting to watch the Polish EU Council Presidency (at the beginning of 2025).
On the different competencies, I think the EU system is well-balanced. Broadly speaking, preventive actions are in the hands of the European Commission. Repressive actions, such as freezing funding and suspending voting rights, are in the hands of the Member States, even if based on precise analysis and recommendations from the European Commission. Interpretative actions come from the European Court of Justice. It would be a bad development if the Commission would try to add more competencies, somewhere at the edges of Lisbon Treaty. You can already do a lot with the powers that we have – and in any case the Commission should not replace the national constitutional courts and the free will of citizens.
If we want to protect democracy, we must respect the free will of the people. So, we really try to protect the electoral systems, for instance by strengthening media freedom, ensuring a pluralism of views.
Before the 2024 European elections, representatives of NGOs in Bulgaria mentioned ongoing vote-buying. It seems that the EU has focused more on foreign interference than on domestic threats, from political parties. Did you collaborate with the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ensure all threats to democracy were considered?
It's important to understand that democracy can cannibalise itself. For instance, in the United States, the cradle of modern democracy, the person who was organising the coup against the democratic state (The Capitol attack on 6 January 2021) might be elected again. This means that half of the voters in the United States will probably believe him, in case he fails, that elections were manipulated. In these 100 days before elections, something should be done to protect the electoral system, to give people the best possible assurances that there will be no manipulation. There will be one message from the Kremlin spread through every channel and domestic proxies: “the elections were manipulated”. This shows how dangerous foreign interference is. It seeks not only to change the result of elections, but to change the governance system, without having to send soldiers to America.
In Europe, there are many different forms of foreign interference. First, there is disinformation and abuse of artificial intelligence, with interference from state actors such as those from Russia, China and Iran. The second is espionage. This is not for the Commission, but for secret services who are coordinating and exchanging information. Third is cybersecurity. There, we have a well-established system of cooperation between our expert entities, with DG Connect, ENISA and national bodies. We upgraded the legislation and enlarged the funding. And last, there is corruption and hidden financing of political parties and political actors. The next European Commission will have to do more to regulate interest representation and foreign funding in the EU.
It's important to understand that democracy can cannibalise itself. For instance, in the United States, the cradle of modern democracy, the person who was organising the coup against the democratic state (The Capitol attack on 6 January 2021) might be elected again.
Because of the changed geopolitical context, security and defence will play an important role in the next mandate. Do you think that this new security focus is compatible with the next democracy agenda?
I hope it will be done in a smart way, where the protection of democracy inside the EU will be coherently addressed with the protection against foreign interference. I think that there will be a continuation on the fight against disinformation, which is at this moment mainly about the protection of elections.
I had a discussion with the CEO of YouTube not long ago, Neil Mohan, who said they still couldn’t explain to people that there really was a man on the moon. I said: “but let them believe it!” It's not the kind of disinformation that we want to address. There is dangerous disinformation produced with the intention to do harm, in a coordinated manner, financed by foreign actors, like the announcement that elections were manipulated when they were not. I hope that the future Commission will focus on deepening and better funding this kind of fight. There is commitment of Ursula von der Leyen to focus on it.
What would you recommend to your successor for the democracy portfolio?
The efforts to protect democracy, in connection with the rule of law and fundamental rights, will have to continue, using all the competencies at hand, and in a collective effort with the Member States. The European Commission cannot do it by itself and should not try to. It is a collective task. Second, funding will be crucial. If you look at how many billions Russia is investing in spreading propaganda in Europe, and how much we invest in our defense, there is an absolute imbalance. And lastly, the EU institutions should achieve better internal synergies – we need to work better together to protect democracy.
The efforts to protect democracy, in connection with the rule of law and fundamental rights, will have to continue, using all the competencies at hand, and in a collective effort with the Member States.
This interview was conducted on 8 August 2024.
The views and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union.