From democratic resilience to democratic security
Read the executive summary.
In 2019, the newly elected president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, decided to establish a democracy portfolio with a direct Vice-President in charge of it. While democracy had been enshrined in the EU Treaties for quite some time, the topic was not seen as a policy field that the EU had to work on beforehand. However, in view of the rapid democratic backsliding across EU Member States, the Commission proposed an ambitious agenda. Looking back at the 2019-2024 mandate, the Commission managed to deliver on many of its proposals; and it went further than initially planned in the 2019 political guidelines.
Based on the 2024 political guidelines and mission letters to the new Commissioners, the EU’s approach towards democracy seems to have shifted from a focus on democratic resilience towards democratic security. While this slightly changed approach is understandable in view of the threats, such as disinformation and foreign interference, the EU institutions will have to double, or even triple, their efforts to ensure that democracies are protected from both authoritarian decision-makers within the EU and from third countries’ interference, which undermine democratic processes in Europe.
To do so, the EU should consider strengthening democracy as a strategic policy field, relevant for citizens’ well-being, for a striving European economy and for national security. In the next mandate, the European Commission should propose an ambitious democracy agenda, which focuses on all aspects of democracy: rule of law, media freedom, disinformation, anti-corruption, electoral integrity, and aspects of accountability and transparency in EU institutions, as well as improving citizen participation at EU level and investing in civic education.
After a thorough examination of the EU’s 2019-2024 democracy agenda, this study presents recommendations for the next legislative cycle. First and foremost, democracy should under no circumstances be considered an obstacle for effective policymaking and crisis management. The Commission should use all the tools and instruments at its disposal to safeguard democracy and sanction those who do not respect the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), while ensuring full compliance and enforcement of its own legislation in the field, for instance to counter disinformation. It also should more systematically assess and regularly review its response to democratic backsliding to avoid a weaponisation of its own legislation, ensure appropriate funding is allocated to this policy field and ensure alignment of all EU legislation with democratic standards, especially in the field of migration and asylum policy. The planned European Democracy Shield should try to respond to both domestic and foreign threats alike.
Overview of recommendations
- Democracy should not be considered as an obstacle in the way of effective decision-making and crisis management.
- The EU institutions should make full use of existing powers and instruments to protect and sustain democracy.
- The European Commission should ensure full compliance and enforcement of its own legislation in the field of democracy.
- The EU institutions should systematically assess and regularly review their response to democratic backsliding and avoid a weaponisation of their own legislation.
- The EU should consider democracy a public good and invest in it.
- The European Commission should ensure alignment of all EU legislation with EU values.
- The EU institutions should ensure that democratic standards are respected within the EU institutions and decision-making processes.
- The EU should stop politically instrumentalising EU values.
- The EU institutions should improve their internal governance on democracy.
Product details
Table of contents
Executive summary
Abbreviations
Publisher’s foreword
Introductory remarks
1 Introduction and methodology
2 Looking back: the EU’s democracy agenda in the last legislative term (2019-2024)
3 Looking ahead: recommendations for the next mandate (2024-2029) 4 Conclusion
References