NATO summit: What Ukraine needs most urgently

The situation in the US presidential election campaign is becoming increasingly dramatic. Joe Biden and the Democratic Party have found themselves in a totally precarious position, at least since the botched TV debate. It is unclear whether Biden will be re-elected US President in November 2024. 

This is a very bad omen for the European partners and Ukraine in particular. After all, it is foreseeable that no major steps can be expected at the upcoming NATO summit to solidify security guarantees against Putin's belligerent Russia. In particular, Ukraine's eagerly hoped-for invitation to NATO membership is no longer realistic, at least for this year. To ensure that the lack of an invitation does not become a moral damper for Ukraine or encourage Russia to escalate further, the summit must send a different signal of strength and intransigence towards Putin. 

Choosing the right time 

As soon as Ukraine receives an invitation to join NATO, there must be a realistic prospect of admission.

At the same time, it should be clear to Ukraine and NATO that as soon as Ukraine receives an invitation to join the defence alliance, there must be a realistic prospect of acceptance within a reasonable period of time. If this were lacking at the time of the invitation, this could rather pose a threat to Ukraine's security - and would give Russia (or actors such as China) an opportunity to demonstrate NATO's supposed weakness. In other words, an invitation at this point in time would not necessarily help Ukraine. After all, it would not be backed by sufficient military support capacities or a clear understanding of the scope of a security guarantee. Instead, the delay should be used to further prepare such a realistic perspective. There are still some open questions that need to be clarified. 

Models of membership in which the security guarantee or the obligation to provide assistance only extends to the areas currently under Ukrainian control could have a counterproductive effect: it may promise flexibility, at least for "free Ukraine", not to postpone membership until the still very uncertain time when Russia will have vacated the occupied territories. At the same time, however, such a model of membership could de facto recognise the current Russian conquests forever and thus reward aggression after all. Comparisons with the NATO membership of the old Federal Republic of Germany before reunification are not valid here, because the territories occupied by Russia would not remain as a "second" Ukrainian state, but would be permanently exposed to Russification as annexed territories of Russia. Moreover, the incorporation of the Federal Republic did not take place during actual acts of war. Ukraine therefore remains a separate case that requires its own model.

NATO needs Ukraine

Ukraine and the EU can best guarantee their security with Ukraine as a NATO member.

There must be no more grey areas in Europe in terms of security policy. They would be a constant source of insecurity, as the recent past has clearly shown. Ukraine and the EU can best guarantee their security with a Ukraine as a NATO member. This would not only integrate the country symbolically and legally, but also - and this is very important - technically and organisationally. Only the NATO security guarantee can sufficiently deter Putin's Russia from further attacks and imperial land grabs in the long term. Without NATO membership, Ukraine would also be forced to invest significantly more in its own armament and deterrence. It is therefore also more efficient and safer to integrate the Ukrainian military into NATO structures. 

It is not only Ukraine that needs NATO - NATO also needs Ukraine: it is and will remain the first line of defence for the whole of Europe against the threats posed by a revanchist Russia. The military capabilities, the combat experience, the innovative strength and adaptability of the military and society as a whole to the conditions of aggression, not just military aggression, represent an enormous strengthening of NATO. Moreover, with Ukraine in NATO, security in the Black Sea region could be considerably better guaranteed.

What Ukraine needs is clear

For the moment, it is not yet necessary to commit to a model for Ukraine's NATO membership. What is needed, however, is a convincing affirmation of the political will to admit the country to NATO when the situation is ripe - without defining this in concrete terms. The decisive factor at the upcoming NATO summit will rather be that Ukraine receives further substantial commitments for deliveries of ammunition, air defence and long-range missiles to decisively disrupt Russian military logistics and air attack capacities. The ongoing destruction of sensitive infrastructure by Russian air strikes in particular must be countered more quickly, as it poses a direct threat to the country and its future. Every euro or dollar invested now will pay off two and threefold in terms of reconstruction. 

With or without an invitation, Ukraine's short and medium-term needs are clear: it must be sufficiently armed to effectively protect the controlled territories (which is also a condition for all reconstruction efforts). In addition, the Ukrainian army must once again be able to take the initiative on the front lines. 

The upcoming summit in Washington D.C. may yet become a sign of strength.

Further harmonisation with NATO standards should inevitably follow with Western arms deliveries. Once this has been achieved, membership can be finalised all the more quickly at a later date. NATO recently decided to send a special envoy to Kyiv. If this post is filled with high-ranking officials and Ukraine receives commitments for further military supplies, the upcoming summit in Washington D.C. could yet become a sign of strength. That is urgently needed.