The opposition’s overwhelming election victory and the ousting of the Orbán regime are of historic significance for Hungary and the whole of Europe. A conversation with Bulcsú Hunyadi from the Budapest based think tank Political Capital on the reasons behind the success of the TISZA party, the challenges facing the future government, and the tireless efforts of civil society.
Mr Hunyadi, in the Hungarian parliamentary elections, the democratic opposition achieved a landslide victory with a record turnout of just under 80 per cent, a result of historic significance for the whole of Europe. The images and the chants of “Europe” at the rallies in Budapest, and the celebrations following this political breakthrough, personally reminded me of 1989. How did you experience election night?
Unfortunately, I had to work, but there was a festival atmosphere in several parts of Budapest, with cheering crowds, mainly young people, chanting slogans, waving flags, singing songs and honking their horns, just as they would after a victory or a strong performance at major sporting events, such as a football World Cup. Judging by the chants, the change of regime – that is, the ousting of the 16-year-old Orbán regime – as well as a commitment to Europe and a break with the Fidesz government’s pro-Russian stance were the main driving forces behind the celebrations.
Even though the TISZA party, led by Hungary’s future Prime Minister Péter Magyar, was well ahead of the Fidesz-KDNP coalition in polls conducted by reputable polling organisations in the run-up to the election, few had expected the result to be so decisive. What are the reasons behind TISZA’s resounding success?
Like all informational autocracies, the political structure of the Orbán regime was based on the constant demonstration of a social majority. However, when this majority dwindles to the point where public discontent can no longer be concealed, the system faces collapse. One of the main reasons for the loss of this majority was the economic crisis facing the regime. Since autumn 2022, most Hungarian voters have had to accept a decline in their standard of living, as growth stalled and the highest inflation rate in the EU from 2023 onwards eroded purchasing power. Public services such as healthcare, education, transport and the social safety net deteriorated significantly.
A decisive factor was that the majority of people who were dissatisfied with the government did not remain disorganised. From spring 2024 onwards, Péter Magyar and TISZA presented a strong political alternative to Viktor Orbán and Fidesz. The combination of a strong leadership figure and a grassroots, rural-based movement rallying behind him created a unique situation in which the opposition was able to win despite the extremely unequal playing field.
Bulcsú Hunyadi is Head of Programmes and Head of the Radicalisation and Extremism Programme and the Political Capital Institute in Budapest.
His core research interests focus on far-right actors, tactics, narratives and networks, as well as international illiberal-authoritarian networking and influence-building. He has also been involved in research into the illiberal transformation of the Hungarian political system, Russian influence, disinformation and Hungarian domestic politics. He has led or participated in many of Political Capital's research projects and is the author or co-author of numerous studies and articles. He is also a regular feature in the national and international media. He has worked with Political Capital since 2007 and studied history, sociology, and international relations.
Péter Magyar capitalised on the growing discontent and led a populist, anti-establishment campaign against the corrupt and cynical Orbánism that had ruled for 16 years, a regime that had consistently pointed to symbolic, fabricated internal and external enemies. Because the Orbán regime was increasingly perceived as corrupt and out of touch due to the many corruption scandals, it could no longer credibly play the role of the establishment’s critic. The Orbán regime itself became the rejected elite in Hungary, and the majority of Hungarian voters voted to replace it.
The ideological foundation of the Orbán regime has also been shaken. Over the past two years, the regime has been characterised by intellectual erosion and various scandals that have tarnished its image, including scandals relating to child protection, illegal activities at battery factories, corruption scandals, and evidence of subservience to Russia. These scandals have undermined the regime’s credibility and the foundations of its ideological self-definition, such as being family-friendly and sovereign.
A very important factor that boosted Péter Magyar’s credibility and success was that he knew the Orbán system as he had only left it in 2024. This enabled him to convey the extent of the corruption credibly; he knew how to deal effectively with the attacks directed against him, as he understood how propaganda works. Fidesz was also unable to credibly accuse him of being left-wing; he had no links to the old opposition parties and was able to reclaim the national symbols and slogans that had been co-opted and distorted by Fidesz.
In summary, it can be said that it took a fortunate combination of many circumstances and factors, perseverance, political acumen and political work on the issues that moved the electorate for Péter Magyar to defeat the informational autocracy that had existed and been firmly entrenched for 16 years in an unfair election. The direct conversations with citizens that Péter Magyar sought out with great dedication across the country were also a key factor in the success of his campaign.
You describe the Orbán system as an ‘information autocracy’. Could you briefly explain this term?
The Orbán regime and similar political systems are described using numerous terms in political science literature. The most common and general term is “hybrid regime”, which refers to a political system situated somewhere between democracy and dictatorship, that is, total autocracy, in which elements of both systems are intermingled.
There are also more specific terms that highlight a central aspect of the consolidation or exercise of power. One such term is “informational autocracy”, the essence of which is that one of the most important pillars of the ruling political actor’s power is control over the information sphere, which they secure through various means. In other words, instead of the overt, physical repression characteristic of full-blown autocracies, they use soft means to maintain their rule: the instrument of control over information, the use of propaganda, disinformation, as well as the creation of scapegoats and threats.
Of course, other means also secure the power of the ruling regime, foremost among them the abolition of the system of checks and balances, which grants it unrestricted power to abuse state institutions for party-political purposes, to tailor the electoral system to its own needs, and much more.
Viktor Orbán conceded defeat on the very evening of the election, which was another surprise on that election night. Before the election, one of the key questions was whether a handover of power would go smoothly should the opposition win. How do you assess Orbán’s reaction, and how might he position himself in the coming weeks? What scenarios must TISZA prepare for?
Viktor Orbán had no other choice. The defeat was too clear-cut, and he lacked the political clout and support to act otherwise. Fidesz and Viktor Orbán have suffered a heavy defeat, whilst the TISZA Party secured a historic victory on Sunday, winning the most votes and the highest proportion of seats in the country’s history since 1990. Nevertheless, the Fidesz party had a large electorate, more than 2 million voters, who are now presumably very disappointed and perhaps also concerned or even angry. The question is whether there will be a search for those responsible and a process of accountability within the party. Orbán announced that, with immediate effect, the main objective would be to strengthen the party and the Fidesz community from within. Fidesz supporters are, first and foremost, supporters of Viktor Orbán. So if Orbán were to step down and retire, this could lead to the disintegration of Fidesz, which is why I consider this unlikely for the time being. Orbán announced on Monday, 13 April, that he would be visiting the local party organisations and that a meeting of the party executive would take place on 28 April. Then we will be better able to see what Fidesz and Orbán are planning.
According to the latest vote count, the TISZA Party has secured 136 out of 199 seats, giving it a two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution, which now gives it the opportunity to restore democracy in Hungary. In your opinion, what will be the key factors in the coming weeks and months?
Péter Magyar intends to form his government as soon as possible. The National Electoral Commission must confirm the official final results by 4 May. The new National Assembly must then be convened by 12 May. Only at that point will the outgoing parliament’s term expire and the Orbán government become a caretaker government. The new parliament will then elect the Prime Minister, who will appoint the members of his cabinet.
One of the new government’s first steps will be to restore the institutions responsible for combating corruption and upholding the rule of law, not least because this is a prerequisite for Hungary to gain access to funds from the EU Cohesion and Recovery Funds, which have been withheld due to concerns regarding the rule of law and corruption under the Orbán regime. The new government must take action in this regard by August. Other priorities are likely to include reforming the state media apparatus controlled by the Fidesz party, dismantling the Fidesz propaganda machine, and restructuring institutions.
One of Péter Magyar’s key priorities will be to replace leadership in key institutions that could block the new TISZA government, including the Office of the President, the Curia (Hungary’s Supreme Court), the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Constitutional Court, the Media Authority, the Court of Auditors and the Hungarian Competition Authority. Should the incumbents refuse to step down voluntarily, this could lead to a protracted constitutional conflict and uncertainty. The pace of these changes may also depend on how effectively Viktor Orbán can exert his influence over his appointees, which is naturally in his fundamental interest. Should, however, the head of an institution refuse to step down, the new government can exert considerable political pressure. It is also possible that heads of institutions who have hitherto been loyal to Fidesz may align themselves with the new government. Should the incumbents insist on retaining their posts, TISZA, with its two-thirds majority, could remove undesirable heads of institutions through constitutional amendments.
Another priority will be to hold members of the Orbán regime legally accountable. The new government will most likely establish the institutional and legal foundations for this as soon as possible and ensure that investigations and proceedings are conducted lawfully, freely and independently.
Péter Magyar has announced an end to Hungary’s policy of obstruction at EU level; since entering the European Parliament in 2024, TISZA has been a member of the European People’s Party group. What are TISZA’s specific priorities regarding European policy?
The new government’s top priority will be to secure the release and procurement of the frozen EU funds, which the Hungarian economy urgently needs, and the deadline is already very tight. As mentioned, the reforms must be adopted by the end of August and the applications for disbursement submitted by the end of September. To this end, reforms to strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption must be implemented by August. Péter Magyar also intends to submit Hungary’s application to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office shortly.
Furthermore, it is the new government’s express intention to reaffirm Hungary’s commitment to the EU and NATO. It will likely adopt a constructive stance on various issues, but it is also certain that there will be symbolic red lines, if only to avoid providing Fidesz with unnecessary targets for attack at home. For example, Magyar announced that, like many other governments of other Member States, he did not support accelerated EU membership for Ukraine, but had no objections to the start of accession negotiations. Regarding the EU loan for Ukraine, he said this was a settled matter. Viktor Orbán had already agreed last December on the condition that Hungary would not have to participate, and in his view this condition was necessary because the country was in a very difficult economic situation.
With Orbán’s election defeat, Putin, Xi and Trump are losing one of their most important allies. Through their close ties with Orbán, they have so far pursued the aim of dividing and weakening the EU. This has given rise to close interdependencies and privileged partnerships, particularly in the fields of energy and industrial policy. How will the future government address these dependencies? And what foreign policy priorities will the new government pursue?
priorities will the new government pursue?
This strong mandate will enable the TISZA government to initiate a decisive shift in foreign policy. As already mentioned, TISZA’s top priority is an EU- and NATO-friendly foreign policy, with the aim of restoring Hungary’s status as a constructive, committed and reliable partner. However, it is also to be expected that TISZA will not shy away from conflicts with the EU on certain issues in order to counter Fidesz’s attempts to portray TISZA as a puppet of the EU.
As a member of the European People’s Party, TISZA will certainly attach high priority to maintaining good and close contacts with the German government, particularly with the CDU/CSU. This is also due to the Hungarian economy’s dependence on the German economy.
As regards regional relations, the TISZA government is seeking a close alliance with Poland and Austria. It is no coincidence that Péter Magyar’s first two foreign trips will be to Warsaw and Vienna. A pragmatic relationship is expected with the Czech Republic, whilst relations with Slovakia could be rather conflict-ridden. Relations with Ukraine, on the other hand, are likely to improve gradually.
TISZA’s victory was based, among other things, on the resurgent anti-Russia sentiment within Hungarian society. Young people in particular were concerned about Hungary’s dwindling standing in the EU and Orbán’s closeness to Putin’s Russia. The slogan “Russians, go home” once again played an important role in this election campaign, much as it did during the 1956 revolution and the regime change of 1989. Nevertheless, the new TISZA government is seeking a pragmatic relationship with Moscow, as Hungary is heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas. The government has, however, promised to reduce this dependence by investing in energy independence and diversification, with a view to gradually reducing Russian energy imports. But I do not expect Russian influence to disappear overnight. Russia will likely try to win over the new government. Both Fidesz and the far-right party Mi Hazánk could remain important platforms for advancing Russian interests in Hungary.
As for relations with the United States, Péter Magyar was careful not to criticise Donald Trump during the election campaign. TISZA is presumably aiming for a pragmatic relationship with the US. Yet the question remains as to whether Washington intends to redefine its friendly relations with Viktor Orbán overnight.
The TISZA government’s policy towards China is likely to be characterised by a combination of pragmatic openness and a strict system of conditions geared towards national interests. The core of this approach is that the future government will recognise China as one of the world’s most influential powers, strive for active diplomatic relations, but place economic cooperation on a new footing. Companies will be expected to comply fully with Hungarian and European laws. In future, economic incentives for foreign investment are likely to be assessed on the basis of the added value they bring to Hungary. Preference will probably be given to agreements that benefit both sides and directly contribute to Hungary’s GDP and the prosperity of its population.
For the past 16 years, the Orbán system has served as a blueprint for far-right governments in Europe and around the world in their efforts to reshape their states in an autocratic manner. Fidesz plays a leading role in international far-right networks. Following the 2024 European elections, Viktor Orbán founded the ‘Patriots for Europe’ group, which has since become the third-largest political group. There are close links to the MAGA camp, the AfD and many other far-right parties. What does Orbán’s election defeat mean for these networks?
I expect that Fidesz’s defeat will have a negative impact on the global political network of the so-called illiberal, autocratic International. Viktor Orbán was not only a role model and a blueprint for parties and politicians belonging to this network, but his regime also provided these actors with extensive practical help and support in pursuing their common goal of weakening the EU. The defeat of the Orbán regime calls into question the viability of illiberal solutions and models. It offers important lessons for democratic and pro-European forces and could thus stem the advance of illiberal systems in Europe and beyond, or at least call it into question.
A key reason for the opposition’s landslide victory was the tireless efforts of Hungarian civil society and the investigative media. The think tank Political Capital, for which you work, was also under immense pressure. Which resilience strategies proved decisive?
It was 16 long years during which we had to work under constant attack, smear and discrediting campaigns, as well as the repeatedly threatened prospect of administrative, legal and financial elimination. That was enough time to come to terms with the situation and cope with it, both professionally and personally. It was very important to develop emotional and mental resilience so as not to be swayed by the attacks. After a while, these even had a strengthening effect: if the regime attacks us, it means that our work matters and that we are doing it well. It was also important that cooperation between the independent actors developed and deepened, so that we did not fragment our energies and resources, but instead strengthened one another and became more effective. Furthermore, we did not hide away or let fear get the better of us.
Despite all the attacks and attempts to unsettle us, we consistently held fast to our democratic values. We proudly represented and defended them, and in doing so perhaps even set an example and gave strength to others. We did not allow ourselves to be deterred. Despite all the attacks and attempts to distract us, we focused on our work, on researching issues that are important from a democratic, pluralist and Western-oriented perspective, in order to uncover, understand and highlight opposing processes. We actively communicated about our work, published our findings and informed the public. In this way, we brought these issues into the public discourse. In parallel with the changing social, economic and political circumstances, these issues have also borne fruit.
Mr. Hunyadi, thank you for your insights.
The conversation took place on 14 April 2026 in German and it was conducted by Eva van de Rakt.
The views and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union | Global Dialogue.
