As the global order becomes increasingly multipolar, Africa has emerged as a key arena of geopolitical competition. Shifting power dynamics and the growing influence of China are pushing the European Union to rethink its engagement with the continent, while African countries seek more balanced and diversified partnerships on their own terms.
Africa’s place and role have never been more important than in the current geopolitical and multipolar world context, with shifting global power dynamics. Until recently the EU has been Africa’s largest trade partner with goods trade exceeding €280 billion in 2021. However, Africa’s trade partnerships have significantly shifted, with Asia emerging as the primary trading partner.
China’s growing presence in Africa has challenged the European Union’s and the United States’ influence in the continent by offering an alternative to conventional Western partners.
China’s growing influence in Africa, particularly in infrastructure, trade, and development financing, has also prompted the EU to review its approaches and align itself with Africa’s aspirations with an inclusive approach which considers the continent’s development priorities.
To reengage the continent, and in its strategic battle to counter Beijing’s clout in Africa mainly propelled by the Belt and Road Initiative, Brussels has initiated the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package with promises of €150 billion worth of investment between 2021-2027 in sectors critical to Africa’s development (i.e. digitalisation, education, energy transition, transport, pharmaceuticals).
Besides, the EU is outraced by China in acquiring critical minerals needed for the future industrial, and digital development. The EU’s dependency on China on that front has been at the heart of debates in Brussels. For Europe, Africa with its resources remains important and central to change such a situation. In that regard, the EU has passed the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), effective May 23, 2024, to ensure its self-sufficiency in mineral supply chains, including extraction, refining, and processing. The EU has concluded strategic partnerships with Namibia, the DRC, Zambia, Angola, and Rwanda to provide its industries (digital, defence, aerospace, green technology) with critical, and strategic raw materials.
Europe must accept new realities
The latter are welcome developments. However, European actors should refrain from interfering with African countries’ engagement, mainly with global emerging powers (i.e. China and Russia) that Brussels considers to be competitors, rivals, or enemies, because African governments will not accept to be guided by EU policymakers in their choice of global partnerships. In order to pursue economic pragmatism and redefine, restructure and rebalance their engagement with their traditional partners, mainly the US and the EU, African countries are seeking a variety of partnerships, including those with China and other emerging economies such as India, Brazil, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia.
For a long time, African governments have considered that their engagement with their traditional partners has not truly contributed to the continent’s development expectations due to the legacy of Western-dominated political economic governance, financial architecture, trade system among others.
In a multipolar world, Africa can now influence and impact the rules and systems that have historically held back the continent’s development. However, Africa’s fragmentation into several countries with divergent political structures (i.e. democracies, autocracies), diverse economic interests pose challenges to the continent’s relations, and engagement with external actors. Africa must speak with one voice (with the AU as the key actor, and primary platform to engage foreign partners) to improve its collective negotiation capacity to ensure its voice is heard internationally. A multipolar world, which serves as a counter to Western influence on the continent, is a vision that African leaders can get on board with. Therefore, China has generally been welcomed. However, there is growing scepticism.
Beside financing and building infrastructure in African countries to enhance regional connectivity across the continent, China also promotes alternative ideas and concepts of development favourable to a Chinese-centric order in Africa. Geopolitical competition between China, the United States, and the European Union plays a major role in Africa, as different external actors seek to contrast their commitments with those of their competitors in order to influence public perception of the risks and opportunities arising from investments made by the other party.
Africa’s development has been hindered by the lack of industrialisation of its economies. African governments aim to change this trend and call for economic transformation with industrial development policies to process raw materials on the continent for value addition.
The EU’s need for critical raw materials meets such a call and can contribute to support local value addition and processing in African countries, rather than just extraction of raw materials.
The EU’s initiatives related to the Global Gateway and to the access of critical minerals in Africa with investments in critical development sectors (i.e. digitalisation, energy, transport, health, industrialisation among others) also contribute to counter China’s increasing influence (mainly through the BRI) on the continent that Brussels considers to shape and impact its relations with Africa. Most of the projects entailed in those initiatives by the EU vis-à-vis Africa are yet to materialise, are in their starting phase, or remain promises for the moment.
Although China’s engagement with Africa is generally perceived as being driven by economic pragmatism rather than the political governance objectives of EU foreign policy, this perception is currently changing. Indeed, it is altering current trends in Africa’s engagement both with its traditional and emerging partners: While China’s presence in Africa is primarily economic, Beijing is increasingly engaging with the continent by expanding its influence beyond the economic sphere. This expansion is achieved through various mechanisms and narratives, as well as by targeting sectors such as politics, information, culture and education. These sectors form the basis of China’s strategy for Africa. China’s interests in these sectors are changing the way African populations perceive its presence on the continent. This presence has been criticised for its links to debt dependency, a lack of transparency, poor labour conditions and environmental concerns, among other issues.
Greater African agency is good news for Africans
By politically engaging with African governments, China expands its economic interests across the continent, which in turn earns Beijing supporting voices among African officials for its global political influence particularly in international fora, or within the United Nations. In multilateral fora and international organisations, China counts on the political and diplomatic support of African governments when engaging with developed countries on global issues as well as China’s domestic issues. China’s close political and diplomatic ties with African countries contribute to its international position vis-à-vis the United States, and the European Union, and its growing influence in the United Nations and other international organisations. Therefore, the great power rivalry directly and indirectly features in the United States’, the European Union’s, and China’s engagement in Africa.
Under the conditions of great power rivalry and competition between China, the United States, and the European Union, African countries exert their agency for a diversified partnership.
To give an example: With the aim to reduce reliance on Bretton Woods institutions for finance, African countries find alternatives to support their development, mainly through diversified partnerships, funding mechanisms, and instruments emerging partners make available to them. Emerging partners’ financial institutions (i.e. the China-Africa Development Fund – CAD Fund, the BRICS New Development Bank, Saudi Fund for Development among others) finance development projects across the continent. While African countries are diversifying their global finances, increasingly endogenous financial mechanisms and instruments are initiated to support development projects in the continent. These mechanisms, however, are not without their own challenges which is why African governments call for the establishment of African financial institutions for financial sovereignty, resources mobilisation, and less dependency on foreign currency finances. Such initiatives enable African countries to do less with financial conditionalities of their partners, mobilise financial resources on their own terms, set economic priorities, provide funds to support development projects, mitigate currency volatility related conversion issues and reduce external financial dependency.
Changing Africa-EU relations in the era of global power shifts
The EU’s declining clout on the continent coincides with the EU’s renewed interest in African countries. Calls for sovereignty and the influence of other external actors across the continent (e.g. China) are driving structural changes in Africa-EU relations. Pragmatism for economic development and the rupture with Western influence across the continent drive the new directions of Africa-EU relations. African leaders can get on board with the vision of a multipolar world that serves as a counter to Western influence on the continent. Therefore, China has generally been welcomed. However, there is now growing scepticism regarding Beijing’s approach, which opens up new possibilities for EU engagement with Africa on African terms.
