Selected voices from China after the 2024 US presidential election

Key take-aways

1. A New Normal in U.S.-China Relations: In his first term, Donald Trump disrupted the long-established course of U.S.-China relations. President Biden largely maintained the tariffs Trump had imposed. Both political camps in the U.S. have emphasized a more robust stance toward China ever since. This signals a bipartisan consensus in Washington regarding China. Chinese analysts have widely acknowledged this.
2. Notably cautious tones from China: Both Chinese officials and academic voices have adopted a rather reserved tone before and after the election, stressing the need for pragmatic preparedness. State media is carefully managing its public messaging. In at least one case, a nationalist firebrand blogger was censored and banned for openly supporting Donald Trump. 1
3. Focus on Economic Concerns: Most comments by Chinese analysts point at concerns about the economic impact of Trump’s second term—particularly trade disputes and technology-related tensions—rather than the geopolitical or security aspects of U.S.-China relations. 
4. Analysis of the shape of the U.S. Democracy and criticism of Western pluralism: Many Chinese observers of U.S. politics focus on the future of American democracy, particularly highlighting a polarized political environment and questioning the electoral legitimacy. Interestingly, this analysis is sometimes linked to a critique of so-called “leftist ideologies” in the West.
5. Conceptual Challenges in Interpreting U.S. Political Narratives: Against the backdrop of working within an authoritarian state, Chinese experts may find it particularly challenging to raise concerns about an autocratic shift in the U.S. under Donald Trump, as well as assumptions about the role of the so-called Deep State.
6. Uncertainty for U.S.-China and EU-U.S. Relations: While the future dynamics between the U.S.-China, and the EU-China relations under a second Trump term remain uncertain, there is a slightly optimistic expectation among some Chinese analysts that China-EU relations may improve due to common challenges.
7. Limited Focus on Security Issues So Far: Reactions to U.S.-China security issues have been limited, but Chinese analysts are expected to comment more as Trump appoints key figures to his administration.

US China policy since 2016

Since Donald Trump's election as the 45th U.S. President in 2016, the United States took decisive measures to reshape its policy toward the People’s Republic of China, setting a new trajectory for U.S.-China relations that would continue under President Biden and mark a period of strategic competition, and even rivalry. President Trump launched a trade war, accusing China of unfair trade practices and of “taking advantage of the United States on Trade, Intellectual Property Theft, and much more.” 2 In 2018 and 2019, Trump imposed tariffs on more than $550 billion worth of Chinese products. He also became the first U.S. president since the U.S. severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979 to accept a congratulatory call from a sitting Taiwanese President. In 2020, he announced that the U.S. would reject nearly all of China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Additionally, he launched the “China Initiative” as part of the National Security Strategy—a policy that the Biden administration later reversed—and placed more than 300 Chinese companies on a blacklist. 3 Trump’s rhetoric was often aggressive and confrontational, and U.S.-China relations significantly deteriorated during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Trump, after initially downplaying the virus, began blaming China for misleading the world, including at the UN General Assembly.

When Joe Biden took office in 2021, his administration softened the rhetoric but continued a robust approach toward China, largely maintaining the tariffs set by his predecessor while implementing new measures. However, Biden focused on coordinating with allies in the Indo-Pacific and globally to secure their support in imposing stricter controls on technology exports to China and limiting imports from China. His administration’s efforts to reduce the trade deficit and address strategic dependencies on China reflected the continuation of a broad bipartisan agreement in Washington.

This consensus was also evident in the election campaigns of both Trump and Biden/Harris, where the U.S. perception of its own national security expanded beyond traditional concerns, and included from then on, cross-border data flows and supply chain vulnerabilities, among others. Leading up to the 2024 elections, the U.S. political consensus on maintaining a firm stance toward China remained clear, and Harris indicated she would continue a hardline policy. During the campaign, Harris identified China as the primary national security threat and announced her intention to uphold strict export controls on high-tech products destined for China, as well as to further restrict tech imports from China. While affirming support for the One-China policy, Harris made it clear that Taiwan could count on U.S. backing in times of need. Donald Trump committed to an even more aggressive stance on China in his 2024 campaign, framing his policy as essential for "protecting American workers" and closing the trade deficit. His proposals focused on reducing U.S. dependencies on China, particularly in critical industries, and increasing domestic production in key sectors. However, Trump also questioned the level of U.S. support for Taiwan’s defense.

Commentary from China before and after the elections

Against this background, it was not surprising that Chinese analysts and commentators anticipated a continuation of a confrontational approach from the U.S. toward China, regardless of the expected election outcome. However, beneath this broader trend of a more robust China policy, analysts recognized stark differences in policy styles and diplomatic approaches between the two candidates. Kamala Harris was viewed as a potentially more predictable and stable president, while the sharp fluctuations in policy seen during Trump’s first term were expected to continue in the case of a second term. Trump’s tendency toward bilateral deal-making, however, was also seen as an opportunity, particularly in contrast to Harris's likely emphasis on multilateral policies and alliance-building, which would have presented China with new challenges on the global stage.

In addition to concerns about the Chinese domestic economy, some analysts view Trump’s re-election as signaling the beginning of the end for global (neo)-liberalism, with a further shift toward unilateralism and a potential overhaul of the established international order—particularly regarding international trade institutions like the WTO. Along similar lines, for other commentators Trump's presidency marks a resurgence of nationalism, with a focus on revitalizing American manufacturing at the expense of multilateral cooperation, especially in sectors like green energy. As analysts reflect on Trump’s second term, they also express growing concerns about the state of American democracy itself. Many warn that if American democracy fails to withstand its internal crises, it could lead to a shift towards autocracy (专制国家), destabilizing not only the U.S. but potentially triggering widespread global uncertainty. This topic also sparked strong public interest, reflecting widespread concerns about the future direction of U.S. democracy and society.

For this article, we have included insights from some of the most prominent Chinese commentators on U.S. politics and have also analyzed key discussions surrounding the U.S. elections and Donald Trump, both before and after the election.

Wang Jisi, Founding President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University

[...] The Trump administration maintained a degree of flexibility toward China. Despite its punitive tariffs and other measures, it remained open to trade talks and demonstrated some willingness to compromise on thorny issues such as technological competition and Taiwan [...]. 4

In a piece for Foreign Affairs, which was also circulated in Chinese media, Wang and his colleagues noted that Donald Trump did not hold a rigid ideological view of China’s system and leadership. Despite their expectation that Trump would almost certainly pursue a more aggressive trade policy toward China, they bear hopes for his tendency for dealmaking especially in pursuing agreements with Beijing on consumer goods, energy and technology. They also discuss the possibility that Trump might use Taiwan as a bargaining chip to gain leverage in trade. Wang et al. also recognize that during his first presidency, he had largely allowed his administration to promote the "China Threat" narrative, which, according to Wang, significantly hindered scientific, academic, and cultural exchanges between the two nations during Trump's term, inflicting lasting damage on U.S.-China relations. 

Prof. Yan Xuetong, Tsinghua University

I don’t think Trump will go further than US President Joe Biden on the Taiwan issue. If you compare the policies of the Biden and Trump eras, Biden’s [administration] is more inclined towards Taiwan’s independence than Trump. One thing you may have noticed is that Trump always claimed that he was the only US president since the Cold War who had not been involved in a new war. What does this mean? Trump really does not want to go to war with China in the Taiwan Strait. He will be more cautious than Biden in terms of preventing a war across the strait. 5

Yan expected a continuation of the deterioration of US-China relations. While his outlook on the impact on Taiwan is positive, he expects difficulties for Beijing in trade if Trump imposes higher tariffs. China would only have limited options for retaliation. A second Trump term would have the potential for improved EU-China relations, Yan Xuetong argues, also helped by European dissatisfaction with the US.

Prof. Da Wei, Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University

If Trump wins, China-U.S. relations will likely worsen, possibly to the level of 2020. There won’t be official channels of communication, and Trump is serious about tariffs. China will retaliate, and without communication channels, this could lead to a vicious cycle. Many people believe Trump will make deals, but it’s unclear what those deals will be, and he would first pressure China. Trump's team, unlike Harris's, is overwhelmingly hardline on China. 6 [own translation]

Da Wei emphasized that a "New Normal" in US-China relations has emerged, characterized by sustained strategic competition, regardless of the outcome of the elections. He argued that Washington’s hardline stance on China is likely to persist, whether Trump or Harris leads the next administration. Da Wei also predicted that Trump’s more aggressive economic approach would aim to curb China’s economic growth through intensified tax and monetary policies. Additionally, he anticipated that technological restrictions on China would tighten, especially in critical fields such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence, as the US seeks to limit China’s access to cutting-edge technologies.

Given this reality, Da Wei recommends that China should maintain strategic composure and enhance its self-reliance and economic resilience to effectively address ongoing US pressures. For Chinese academics and policymakers, Da Wei advised adopting a long-term, systematic perspective on US-China relations, emphasizing the need to avoid short-term reactions and instead cultivate a comprehensive understanding of the strategic competition with the US. He underscored the importance of pursuing the broader national goal of “rejuvenation,” with a focus on high-quality, sustainable development amid challenging global dynamics.

Huang Jing Shanghai International Studies University and Jin Canrong, Renmin University

In the past, political disagreements in the U.S. were primarily about policy, which allowed room for negotiation. But now, they’re rooted in identity, which is non-negotiable. This is a significant and dangerous shift, not only in the U.S. but also in Europe. Identity-based conflicts are far more difficult to resolve than policy-based ones, leading to a decrease in political quality. 7 [own translation]    

At the recent ‘Guan Forum’ hosted by Guancha (The Observer), a Chinese online media platform known for its – often nationalist and critical stance toward Western policies – commentary on global and domestic issues, Huang Jing and Jin Canrong discussed the state of American democracy and possible election outcomes. Both anticipated a Trump victory, citing the gap between the positive economic indicators in the U.S. economy and the actual challenges faced by many Americans in daily life. Huang Jing pointed specifically to inflation, immigration issues, and foreign policy as key contributors to widespread dissatisfaction with the current U.S. administration.

Jin Canrong raised the possibility that the so-called "Deep State" could interfere with the election outcome to favor Kamala Harris, a move he argued would further erode transparency in U.S. politics and elections, and thereby (un-ironically) employing the transnational vocabulary of right-wing political commentary. He also commented on what he perceives as a weakening in the U.S. political system's ability to self-correct, attributing this to a shift from policy-driven to identity-driven governance. This shift, he suggested, has complicated the political landscape, undermining traditional democratic processes. This debate is also mirrored with broader online debates, where many have expressed support for Trump’s conservative, assertive approach over the Democratic focus on cultural pluralism and social issues—values that some argue diverge from “traditional Chinese perspectives”.

Prof. Huang Yusheng, Tsinghua University 

If American democracy fails to endure this test and is overthrown, not only will the United States move toward autocracy, but it will also face genuine decline. The world will become more uncertain and may even regress, possibly descending into a more barbaric state. 8 [own translation]

Also discussing the state of American democracy Huang discusses the risks of the US to shift towards autocracy (专制国家). He emphasizes that not only harm the country, but also will destabilize the global order: A closed, dissent-suppressing, and anti-rational America would be dangerous. Yet, he hopes for the efficiency of the system’s checks and balances to avoid this “bleaker and perhaps desperate” future for people around the world. Huang also mentions what he perceives as the reasons for Trump’s return to power: “leftist thinking”, and an uncritical principle of unlimited pluralism. Trumps return would suggest that the American electorate have grown weary of these uncritical tendencies – and a larger social movement against this may sweep trough Europe and America. 

Tu Xinquan, Dean of the China WTO Research Institute, University of International Business and Economics

Traditionally, the U.S. views global public goods provision as essential to maintaining its dominance […] But Trump’s logic is different. He aims to maintain U.S. dominance while shifting costs to others, seeing trade deficits as America’s burden and therefore rejecting free trade and the WTO […]. 9

While ignoring that China’s current approach to reform also does not address key problems of the WTO, Tu Xinquan highlights Trump's repeated threats to withdraw the U.S. from the organization during his first term. In discussing the potential impact of Donald Trump's return on the WTO, Tu Xinquan highlights Trump's repeated threats to withdraw the U.S. from the organization during his first term. This may cause serious challenges upon his return, particularly regarding budgetary issues. Tu emphasizes that, for now, the WTO's only viable approach is to be reactive. Member states, including China, will need to adjust by exploring alternative operational strategies or negotiating a compromise on leadership if necessary. One of the most pressing concerns is the renewal of the Director-General’s term—if the U.S. opposes it, a new candidate acceptable to the U.S. may need to be found, which could create internal tensions. Despite these challenges, Tu believes that a U.S. exit from the WTO remains unlikely.

Lu Xiang, Research fellow and expert on US affairs, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 

Lu Xiang suggested that Trump may prioritize revitalizing the entire American industrial chain, with a focus on traditional manufacturing and fossil fuel industries. Lu also anticipates that Trump will be less supportive of the green energy transition and could impede the growth of renewable energy sectors. 10

Looking forward

Further commentary from Chinese analysts is expected, especially following the nomination of key figures to the Trump administration. So far, most analysis has centered on the economic implications of his return to office, as shown above. With Pete Hegseth nominated for Defense Secretary, comments are emerging now on security and defense issues. For instance, Zhu Feng, Executive Dean at Nanjing University’s School of International Studies, voiced concerns about Hegseth’s lack of experience, warning it could pose risks for future U.S.-China military relations. Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University, shared similar reservations.  So far, we could not find comments on the expected appointment of two prominent China hawks, Marco Rubio and Mike Walty as Secretary of State and National Security advisor, but will continue to monitor and share Chinese reactions to developments in the United States.