Berlin 2026: Elections to the House of Representatives and the District Councils

The Berlin elections to the House of Representatives and the twelve district councils have come as a bombshell and reflect the desire for change: with a marked rise in voter turnout and 16- and 17-year-olds being granted the right to vote for the first time, the political fringes have been significantly strengthened, whilst the centre has been weakened. As was recently the case in Saxony-Anhalt, younger and middle-aged voter groups in particular are receptive to the political fringes, whilst the centre is increasingly under threat due to the ageing of its core electorate.

At state level, The Left, with 25.7 per cent (+13.4 percentage points), is by far the strongest party, whilst the AfD, with 16.3 per cent (+7.2 per cent), is the third-largest party in the state. The previously governing CDU (18.8 per cent / -9.5 per cent) and its coalition partner, the SPD (12.1 per cent / -6.3 per cent), have suffered massive losses. The Greens, previously in opposition, suffer a clear defeat (14.3 per cent / -4.1 per cent); in key inner-city districts, they also lose their local dominance to The Left. The election campaign was characterised by crises and scandals, as well as a lack of high-profile candidates; housing policy dominated the agenda, particularly the issue of expropriation, but issues such as migration, internal security and the Middle East conflict were also, in some cases, exploited for political gain and/or influenced voters. The election results reveal clear geographical differences between the city centre and the outskirts, as well as between the western and eastern peripheral districts. Forming a government will require compromises; it remains to be seen to what extent the future government will reflect the city as a whole.

State election against a backdrop of national political sentiment

The Berlin elections to the House of Representatives and the twelve district assemblies were clearly embedded in the national political climate. Dissatisfaction with the federal government and a Chancellor whose approval ratings are at a low ebb offer no support to the CDU–SPD state government. The nationwide prevailing sentiment of an economy in decline aligns with a problem-centred perception of the city, even though improvements have been achieved in the meantime. The debate over fuel prices complements the debate over rents in Berlin; both are symbols of rising living costs and thus the starting point for a clear desire for change amongst sections of the electorate. The strong polarisation, as recently seen in Saxony-Anhalt, finds its counterpart in a highly segmented party and voter landscape. And yet the Berlin election is clearly shaped by state politics; neither the structures of party competition nor the election campaign correspond in their basic pattern to the other current state elections, as the starting point in the city-state of Berlin is too specific.

Scandals and crises during the election campaign

Noteworthy is the multitude of scandals and crises that accompanied the months leading up to the election, including: acute infrastructure crises, in particular a power cut lasting several days, which ultimately led to the withdrawal of Governing Mayor Kai Wegner from the CDU's lead candidacy and the last-minute candidacy of Stefan Evers, Senator for Finance and interim Senator for Culture, for the top office, enabling the CDU to make a fresh start in the election campaign; the CSD attack, as well as violent crime and shootings, and over 500 election-related offences, all of which have fuelled the debate on internal security; open anti-Semitism within relevant factions of The Left, coupled with a strategic exploitation of the Middle East conflict to mobilise certain voter groups, which is polarising urban society and actively bringing the conflict into the city; a search of the SPD's lead candidate's homeshortly before the election, but – in a separate matter – also of the home of a staff member of the AfD's lead candidate. However, due to this multitude of incidents and their respective specific contexts, the impact of the individual crises remains rather limited; ultimately, it is not possible to determine with any certainty to what extent any particular party is benefiting or losing out excessively as a result. The most significant factors, however, are likely to have been the last-minute change of the CDU's lead candidate and the Left Party's potential to mobilise support for the Palestinian cause.

Little charisma, no dominant candidacy, clear segmentation: below-average pool of candidates across all parties

What is striking in this election campaign is the comparatively stable segmentation of the party competition in Berlin: Since the start of the year, the CDU has lost so much support in the polls that the Greens and the Left Party, thanks to their own gains, have been able to enter into a fluctuating but by no means overly dynamic contest for the lead, whilst the SPD never seriously closed the gap on its three rivals in this race and the AfD, although roughly level with them in the polls, occupied a special position with no prospect of forming a government.

The pool of candidates is crucial in this context: following the last-minute withdrawal of the widely known (though largely viewed negatively) incumbent Kai Wegner from the CDU's lead candidacy, none of the leading candidates has been recognised by a majority of Berliners up to the present day. Added to this is the fact that the leading candidates have scarcely managed to inspire confidence beyond their own party. Across all parties, the pool of candidates is therefore below average – even by state election standards – in terms of name recognition and ability to win over voters. The consequence of this candidate line-up is that Berliners are not convinced by any of the candidates. Neither Elif Eralp (The Left) nor Stefan Evers (CDU) nor Werner Graf (The Greens) are regarded as potential 'good mayors' in the run-up to the election (Eralp: 23 per cent, Evers: 22 per cent, Graf: 11 per cent), whilst significantly more disagree (33 per cent and 30 per cent respectively; Infratest dimap). This does not change by election day: for example, only 15 per cent of The Left's voters cited the party's lead candidate as the main reason for their voting decision.

In this situation, the race for the leadership of the city government remains wide open for a long time. However, adopting a strategy that is both plausible and communicatively straightforward, the Left Party and the CDU manage to frame the election as a supposed contest for the top job at City Hall, as they represent different coalition models in terms of a decision on the city's future direction and, moreover, hold firmly opposing positions on a key issue of contention (socialisation/expropriation). The Greens and the SPD fail to generate the necessary momentum in this strategic situation, which they have brought upon themselves up to this point. Neither the SPD nor the Greens have a leading candidate who is, as is necessary in this situation, a standout figure with cross-party appeal, someone who, as an individual, could compensate for (or even strategically address) the rather challenging 'sandwich' position of the two parties: Both parties are needed for both coalition options – the question of who will lead the future state government is therefore supposedly decided between the CDU and The Left, and so the campaign can be narrowed down to the Eralp vs. Evers narrative. In this situation, the Greens are failing to develop a clear answer to the question of what would distinguish a Green-led government; moreover, their campaign – and their approach of going into the election with a 'lead duo for Berlin' – reveals only a limited willingness to take the lead.

This problem is ultimately evident deep within the party's electorate: only Eralp and Evers are seen by their own supporters as potentially convincing Governing Mayors (at 60 per cent each), whilst the Green lead candidate receives far less clear support even amongst his own party's supporters. Only 39 per cent believe he has what it takes to be a 'good Governing Mayor' ahead of the election (whilst 34 per cent of Green supporters consider Eralp and 19 per cent Evers to be potentially 'well-suited' to the role). This low level of support is not solely due to the individual in question, but also reflects a conflict within the Green Party itself ('left of centre' vs. 'centre-left').

The picture is quite different when it comes to preferred leadership: supporters of The Left, the Greens and the CDU unanimously favour leadership by their 'own' party (90–97 per cent approval; Infratest dimap). Taken together, the picture is clear: all three parties are, in effect, unanimously preferred by their respective electorates as the party to lead the government; their own candidates, however, convince only to a limited extent or hardly at all, and in fact not at all among a broader electorate. As recently as early September, over half of those surveyed stated that they would not vote for any of the leading candidates in a direct election; even Eralp and Evers only achieved 13 per cent 'direct election potential' here (Infratest dimap). This situation changed only marginally in the run-up to the election; both candidates remained far from securing majority support for either of them amongst the wider electorate.

Issues are segmenting the electorate: the housing market vs. internal security vs. refugees and migration

The choice of candidates therefore does not play a directly decisive role in this election campaign, although, in particular, the last-minute change of the CDU's lead candidate not only enabled a fresh start to the campaign – and thus presumably prevented a further slump – but also meant that the SPD's strategy of fielding an external, 'realpolitik' candidate against the unpopular incumbent did not pay off (alongside other reasons specific to the party). More decisive were the issues that also help to shape the segmentation outlined above.

In a city where around 85 per cent of households are occupied by tenants and only around 15 per cent by the owners themselves, which has been characterised by a massive influx of new residents for years and is likely to continue growing, the tight housing market is of central importance – for the people, but also in the election campaign. Just a few years after the referendum (in 2021, a majority of Berliners voted in favour of expropriating large property companies; the latest exit polls paint a different picture), the situation is complex and politically charged: Relatively low rents for existing properties make it difficult to retain them, high rents for new tenancies make it hard to move house or move into the city, a housing shortage and a lack of construction activity mean the market is unlikely to ease, and a large proportion of what was once public housing stock was privatised – most recently and on a particularly massive scale just over 20 years ago by the then Red-Red coalition.

The issue is dominating the election campaign; for around a third of Berliners, it is the city's most pressing problem, and it lends itself perfectly to polarising rhetoric. Whilst The Left clearly wishes to return housing stock to public ownership through expropriation – and the Greens, in line with an earlier party resolution, support this in principle – the SPD and, above all, the CDU are firmly opposed to this costly approach and are increasingly focusing on new-build housing. Added to this are populist tones in the campaigns, in which, for example, The Left not only simplifies housing policy for the sake of communication but also, in its key campaign advert, positions itself against the 'establishment' and 'landlords' who allegedly fund the supposed centre-right party network, suggesting that political parties in general can no longer be trusted. CDU lead candidate Evers is also noticeably stepping up his rhetoric during the election campaign, viewing The Left as his main strategic opponent. The fiercely contested debate on housing policy (complemented by issues such as Tempelhofer Feld and the question of federal legislation against expropriation) sets the tone and enables The Left and the CDU, in particular, to attract attention. However, polls on election day already reveal a related problem: whilst the Left, the election's winner, takes a clear stance on this issue, the majority of Berliners are now firmly opposed to it (51 per cent to 37 per cent against expropriation); only voters for the Left are firmly behind the call for expropriation. In this respect, it remains to be seen how this issue – which was ultimately used in the election campaign as a symbol of the 'affordability' debate and proved highly effective, both populistically and emotionally, in campaign communications – will be addressed in government terms after the election. It is precisely this use of the issue that forms a cornerstone of The Left's electoral success; as a comparatively young party – and, above all, one characterised by activism – it has, thanks to its recent massive surge in membership, been able to capitalise on the issue (as well as the Middle East conflict) to its advantage.

Furthermore, through this pointed framing of the issue – and through its role as an opposition party, whose support for housing privatisation in the 2000s bears no relation, either in substance or in personnel, to the party of today – The Left has succeeded in massively expanding the areas in which voters perceive it as competent: Around 37 per cent of Berliners believe the Left Party is capable of ensuring affordable housing.

But not all of Berlin, nor all Berliners, are equally moved by this issue. On the one hand, clear party patterns can be identified; on the other, there are clear geographical distinctions between the urban centre and the periphery, with the city centre both shaping and distorting perceptions of the city. The different living situations, social milieus and interests between the inner and outer areas are clearly reflected in the corresponding party preferences, as is also evident in the issue of rent. Whilst the issue clearly dominates for supporters of The Left, the SPD and the Greens – at over 40 per cent – it carries far less weight among CDU supporters and hardly any at all among AfD supporters. For CDU supporters, the issues of internal security and crime, as well as refugees, migration and integration, also play a recognisably important role, whereas the AfD is able to reach its supporters primarily through the issues of refugees, migration and integration. Thus, whilst there is one issue that shapes the overall picture, it is by no means an issue that concerns all voters equally in this election, especially as other issues (the environment, transport, education, social injustice) also play a certain role amongst individual party supporters.

Greens only fourth-largest party: failed to meet their own expectations

In Berlin, the Greens were not merely aiming to secure a second state premier in Werner Graf alongside Cem Özdemir. Particularly in inner-city districts, the urban contest centred on fundamental issues – namely, hegemony to the left of centre – but also, across the state as a whole, on hegemony within the democratic camp as a whole: In the pre-summer polls, the Greens' lead over the CDU, The Left and the SPD in Berlin was tangible; an electoral success – albeit at a significantly lower level – similar to that recently seen in Baden-Württemberg (against the CDU) or Munich (against the SPD) was structurally and in terms of party competition plausible.

The starting position in Berlin seemed favourable for this: the Greens' role as an opposition party at both federal and state level opened up scope, particularly as the CDU and SPD were at a disadvantage due to their unpopular governance in the State of Berlin and at federal level; the Berlin SPD in particular – after nearly four decades of uninterrupted participation in government – is weakened. Yet the field was open not only towards the centre but also to the left: The Left has grown significantly in recent times, leading to internal party friction and debates. Whether it was that sections of the party – not least in view of the difficult budgetary situation in the State of Berlin – questioned whether to take on government responsibility at all. Or it was the fact that sections of the party act and communicate in a clearly anti-Semitic manner, which is very clearly seen as a problem by supporters of all other parties, especially as experienced, widely recognised former senators and other state politicians have left The Left in the wake of the anti-Semitism controversies. Thus, potential for distancing themselves and establishing an independent line was evident in both directions.

Moreover, the Greens' own position at federal level and in the other federal states appeared favourable: electoral successes in Baden-Württemberg, Munich and also Saxony-Anhalt provided success stories in difficult times, and at federal level too, the Greens had recently consolidated their position at a solid level and were also united in their messaging – as had already been the case during the Baden-Württemberg election campaign – so as not to jeopardise their success in the state elections.

The opportunity for electoral victory was not seized due to the party's own decisions and internal friction: the campaign remained indecisive between participating in government and leading the government, between personalisation and a dual leadership structure, and a lead candidate who ultimately failed to raise his profile sufficiently. Nor was there any sign of a clear strategic decision in favour of a Green-led centre-left or centre-left coalition, combined with the – plausible – idea of uniting rather than dividing as a leading force within such a coalition. The result: the Greens failed to break through in the strategically difficult, yet promising, space between the Left Party and the CDU. The party achieved its worst election result in Berlin in twenty years; the last time it fared worse was in 2006, following its exit from the federal government, when it secured 13.1 per cent – a figure lower than the result now achieved, which also falls short of the current trend in federal politics.

A long-term challenge here is that the Greens in Berlin have also lost support at district level, particularly in the inner-city districts. The metropolitan party, which once held a dominant position in some of these districts, has clearly ceded this role to The Left; former strongholds such as Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (as well as other districts) have been lost. As a result, the Greens are losing an important lever for shaping local policy within Berlin's closely intertwined two-tier city-state system; moreover, even if they were to participate in the state government, it would be a challenge to set policy priorities at both district and state level. For the Greens are now clearly weakened not only at state level but also at district level: The Left is the strongest force, having won six of the twelve districts according to the provisional final results (CDU: four districts; Greens: one district, Tempelhof-Schöneberg; AfD: one district, Marzahn-Hellersdorf). The full implications of this defeat will only become clear in due course, as negotiations are now set to take place in the districts regarding coalition-like electoral alliances and, consequently, alliances for shaping policy.

For the Greens within the federal system, however, the election is not necessarily a complete failure; after all, the Greens will play a central role in the formation of governments in both Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. Should they now enter government in both states, the Greens are therefore likely to succeed in strengthening their influence in federal politics within the Bundesrat through these two elections, and thus, as the federal opposition, to gain a certain degree of influence through the Bundesrat, at least for the time being.

Prospects for government

As was to be expected in the run-up to the election, the result allows for two possible coalitions: a left-wing coalition comprising The Left, the Greens and the SPD, or a centre-left coalition comprising the CDU, the SPD and the Greens. The AfD is not capable of forming a coalition with any other party. The very fact that there are two options at all – which, moreover, represent quite different political ideologies – is a remarkable democratic success in these times. A coalition comprising The Left, the Greens and the SPD appears the more likely scenario: The Left's clear electoral gains, the generally left-leaning orientation of the Berlin Greens (who already sought to send the CDU into opposition during the election campaign) and a weakened SPD, which has also recently lost or alienated key figures in realpolitik – all of this makes a left-wing coalition more probable. And yet: coalition negotiations are likely to prove difficult, as both options – The Left, the Greens and the SPD, or the CDU, the Greens and the SPD – involve policy conflicts that will need to be resolved. Key issues for both coalition options are the topics on the basis of which the Greens and the SPD are likely to decide for or against one coalition option or the other. The SPD, for instance, takes a much more centrist stance on housing policy, largely opposes expropriation, but has clear differences with the CDU, particularly on social policy issues (e.g. free school meals, student travel passes). The Greens, on the other hand, are clearly at odds with the CDU on transport policy – an issue of comparatively great importance to Green voters (an area in which the Greens also enjoy the highest perceived level of competence among all parties) – and in Berlin they are generally closer to The Left; at the same time, the issue of anti-Semitism is likely to play a significant role here, as well as the now predominantly critical stance amongst the electorate on the issue of expropriation.

The question of coalition-building is therefore now a clear policy-based choice between two options; it is, in fact, a decision on the direction the state will take, which must then also be successfully implemented in day-to-day government. However, the coalition decision will also determine whether the future state government and its voter base will be strongly inner-city oriented or represent the entire urban area, and how successfully the fragmented, and in some cases even polarised, urban society can be reunited. This, too, is an important dimension of coalition-building for the city's future, albeit one that has so far received only marginal attention.