Agribusiness Atlas 2026
During the 20th century, food systems globally were largely dominated by US multinational corporations and, to a lesser extent, European ones. In recent decades, this landscape has shifted, as Chinese corporations have steadily expanded their influence in agricultural trade and the agrochemical sector. Since many of these corporations are state-owned, their rise reflects not only market dynamics but also a deliberate government strategy.
Throughout China's history, hunger has often sparked unrest: famines and food insecurity have repeatedly preceded rebellion and conflict, often exacerbating underlying socioeconomic instability. Coupled with factors such as military overreach and corruption, food crises often marked the onset of dynastic collapse. This pattern was evident during the final decades of the Qing Dynasty, China's last imperial government. It experienced a series of major famines with significant consequences between 1810 and 1907. For instance, the famine between 1876 and 1879 alone claimed more than 9.5 million lives. In more recent history, the famine from 1959 to 1961 led to the deaths of tens of millions. It was precipitated by the policies of Mao Zedong, who sought rapid industrialisation and increased agricultural production through his so-called Great Leap Forward. Against this backdrop, the Chinese central authorities have long come to view a stable and sufficient food supply as a foundational pillar of state legitimacy.
Since a significant policy shift in 2013, China has pursued a dual-track approach to food security. At home, the government seeks to maintain self-sufficiency in key staples like rice, wheat, and pork, investing in agricultural technologies such as autonomous systems and artificial intelligence. Internationally, China relies on global markets for non-staples such as soybeans, diversifies its sources, and deepens ties with Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia through long-term supply agreements and overseas investments. As part of this strategy, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) often serve as instruments of Beijing's strategic influence. The government also brings private firms into this effort, providing them with low-interest loans and diplomatic backing.
China's expansion of its agribusiness abroad is also driven by declining domestic food self-sufficiency, which has fallen from 93.6 per cent in 2000 to just 65.8 per cent in 2020. By the end of 2025, China could face a food gap of around 130 million tonnes, including a grain deficit of approximately 25 million tonnes. By 2030, estimates suggest that the country¡s food self-sufficiency rate may further drop below 59 per cent. Externally, China's food security efforts are being shaped by global volatility. Tensions with the United States, disrupted global grain and fertiliser markets as a result of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and a surge in food protectionism, in other words, countries restricting exports in response to global shocks, have all made it harder for Beijing to diversify its food imports.
An examination of key actors highlights the growing scale of China's influence in the global agricultural sector. COFCO Group, a state-owned grain and logistics giant, handled over 108 million tonnes of grain and other agricultural commodities in 2024. Based on its 2022 revenues, COFCO is the second-largest agricultural trader after Cargill. With its 43 billion US dollars acquisition of Syngenta in 2017, ChemChina has provided China with access to advanced seed and agrochemical technologies, strengthening control over global agricultural inputs. Today, the Syngenta Group – including ADAMA from Israel – is the world's largest pesticide and seed corporation with a global market share of 10 per cent in seeds and 25 per cent in pesticides in 2023.
China's agricultural investments are concentrated in regions with both strategic and commercial value. In Africa, Chinese firms, often in collaboration with state-backed initiatives like agricultural demonstration centres, support the distribution of seeds and fertilisers to enhance agricultural productivity. These initiatives are underpinned by intergovernmental frameworks such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Between 2013 and 2023, China established 24 agricultural technology demonstration centres across Africa, bringing Chinese experts together with local farmers, and introduced more than 300 advanced farming technologies. These efforts have led to an average yield increase of 30 to 60 per cent and have benefited over one million farmers across the continent.
In Latin America, especially Brazil and Argentina, China secures key imports such as soybeans and beef, while investing in infrastructure, including ports, hydropower dams, and railways. In Southeast Asia, geographical proximity and rising demand have enabled ventures such as COFCO BiochemicalÕs operations in Thailand.
China's ambitions in global food governance are increasingly visible, particularly through its growing influence in the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Since Qu Dongyu became Director-General in 2019. as the first Chinese national to hold the position, China appears to have gained greater prominence in shaping international agricultural agendas. For example, Syngenta has benefited from FAO approval of several of its highly hazardous pesticides for use in development projects.
Although FAO's enforcement powers are limited, it still provides China with a valuable platform to promote its agricultural standards and development vision.
A handful of corporations dominate our food system, setting prices, profiting from crises, and driving relentless pressure on the environment, farmers, and consumers alike. The Agribusiness Atlas 2026 traces how this concentration of power took hold, and charts the political pathways toward a fairer food system built around the common good.
