The path to digital autonomy: Europe's trilemma

American democracy is under pressure. Attacks on the judicial system, withdrawal from international organisations and a creeping oligarchisation spare no area of policy – not even digital policy.

The ties between Washington’s political establishment and US big tech firms are growing ever closer. Although Silicon Valley has long been regarded as a Democratic stronghold, tech billionaires such as Elon Musk, Peter Thiel and Mark Zuckerberg donated large sums to Trump’s last election campaign and to his 2025 inauguration. The overtures from tech giants are not a one-way street either. The second Trump administration is focusing on deregulation of AI systems and the construction of data centres, massive investment in state surveillance capabilities such as those provided by Palantir Gotham, and extensive immunity from antitrust scrutiny. Never before has the link between digital policy and democracy been so evident as it is now; the former is increasingly being exploited to undermine the latter.

Why is this a matter of concern to us in Europe? Because Germany and Europe are not yet self-sufficient in the digital sphere. Cloud services, operating systems, social media platforms, AI models: the infrastructure on which we base our administration, communication and business operations is heavily reliant on US tech companies. According to a survey conducted by the Swiss company Proton, 83% of Europeans are concerned about this dependence, rising to 90% among Germans. 

This fear has not come out of nowhere. The failure to comply with EU regulations, the integration of Palantir’s surveillance systems into German security agencies and the withdrawal of Microsoft services from the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court make it clear that the power of Silicon Valley is not just a matter of US domestic policy, but also of European security policy.

European digital sovereignty – a toothless tiger?

The European Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen, appears to have recognised these dependencies and has begun to propose a course of action aimed at greater digital and industrial sovereignty: it’s motto, “Buy European”, is a deliberate nod to the American “Buy American” doctrine. In March 2026, she presented the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which is intended to strengthen Europe’s economic independence. Among other things, the legislation is intended to protect key industries and safeguard climate targets, employment and economic growth.

However, after months of delays and tough negotiations with the Member States, little remained of the promise of a “Made in Europe” label – announced in von der Leyen’s State of the Union address. Rather than giving preference to European products across the board, the law now stipulates sector-specific minimum quotas for European components. The focus is on the construction sector, electric mobility and a number of climate-friendly technologies, though not on semiconductors and artificial intelligence, which are key areas of digital dependency. It would appear that the European Commission is now attempting to strike a balance between “Buy European” and business as usual. Almost no one was entirely happy with this. This approach has been the subject of heated debate among the 27 EU Member States, with France emerging as the strongest advocate of a “Buy European” policy and other Member States expressing more critical views. The result is a compromise that highlights Europe’s divisions: too dependent to defend the status quo, and too divided to truly overcome it.

The trilemma: Three approaches, no easy answer

This example illustrates just how difficult it is to find an answer to the question of whether, and how, Europe intends to achieve digital sovereignty. For the EU finds itself in a trilemma: a choice between three options, all of which come at a cost. The first question that arises is: is it sensible, desirable, and even possible to become less dependent on US big tech? And if so, should the answer lie in European autonomy and protectionism? Or should the focus be on building new global partnerships? How Europe balances this trilemma will shape the digital policy agenda for the coming years.

Option 1: Staying the transatlantic course

Opposition to the “Made in Europe” label came not only from Washington, but also from Europe itself. Among the most vocal opponents of a complete break from US tech were German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who also lead two of the EU’s largest industrial nations.

Merz, Meloni and their ilk see maintaining ties with the US in the medium term not only as economically sensible, but also as a security necessity: a deepening rift in transatlantic relations could, among other things, jeopardise US support for Ukraine as well as for NATO as a whole. That would be a risk that many EU member states regard as existential, particularly those bordering Russia. For example, the Lithuanian Minister for the Economy, Edvinas Grikšas, warns that US digital technologies and cybersecurity capabilities play a key role in strengthening his country’s resilience against Russia. The Latvian Minister for Economic Affairs, Viktors Valainis, adds that most European companies simply do not operate at the same level as their US counterparts. In doing so, he highlights a further problem associated with a potential divestment: American tech simply works better. Thanks to global scalability, a well-capitalised stock market and first-mover advantages, US tech giants such as Microsoft and Meta have established themselves as the go-to choice for users worldwide. Although European competitors are catching up, they are still too often unable to match the performance of their US counterparts. Consequently, not only do they currently offer a poorer user experience, some are also more vulnerable to security breaches.

Option 2: Genuine European sovereignty

Dependence on the US entails real risks, but do they justify a radical change of course? For France, the answer is: ‘oui’. It is the only EU Member State to consistently pursue the goal of digital sovereignty by supporting its own tech champions, from cloud provider OVHcloud to AI companies such as Mistral. Its claim to sovereignty is understood not only in national terms, but explicitly in European terms. In the battle over the Industrial Accelerator Act, France therefore fought to the very end to keep the “Made in Europe” label strong.

The logic behind this is reminiscent of a classic problem in international relations: the so-called prisoner’s dilemma, a situation in which the best strategy depends on the strategies expected of the other players. In this case, the prisoner's dilemma takes on the following form: If major powers like China and traditional middle powers such as Canada and Turkey consistently protect their domestic industries, why should Europe be the only one to rely on free trade? Traditionally, the EU has long been regarded as a sceptic of protectionism and as a champion of fair, open competition rules. However, the crux of the prisoner’s dilemma lies in the fact that ideals must be compatible with strategy. If one actor alone insists on cooperation while everyone else is pursuing their own advantage, that actor will neither win nor be heard. Europe must therefore now ask itself how long it can maintain this approach of open, rules-based trade in goods and services in a world that is becoming increasingly insular along national borders.

Option 3: International cooperation across the Atlantic

But what if there were another response to the new global instability that could break free from the vicious circle of protectionism? Germany and other EU Member States have put forward such an alternative: Instead of “Made in Europe”, “Made with Europe”. In other words, this does not mean isolation but, rather, closer partnerships with countries like Canada, the UK and Norway. This approach undoubtedly has its advantages: it avoids the costs of European isolation and strengthens much-needed global partnerships. And it need not be confined to the Global North. That is why a proposal by Green Party digital policy experts goes further: an alliance of free digital nations – a “D-20”:

Europe must not be left to fight this battle alone and must take the lead in forging an international alliance for freedom, transparency and the rule of law in the digital sphere. [...] An alliance of free digital nations – a ‘D-20’ – could stand up to the American and Chinese tech autocrats in the name of democracy and freedom.

A D-20 would break down the apparent dichotomy between US dependence and European independence. It would offer Europe the opportunity to counter American hegemony without resorting to the same protectionist measures. But this gives rise to a classic problem of collective agency: who's in charge? Who pays? And how binding will such alliances be when the next geopolitical shock hits? The history of multilateral digital agreements does not inspire optimism in this regard. The 1998 WTO e-commerce moratorium expired in the spring of 2026, after negotiations had broken down at the last Ministerial Conference. A D-20 would only be as strong as the political willingness of its members to choose cooperation in a world that is becoming increasingly nationalistic. It is precisely this willingness that is currently lacking. It is lacking not only in Washington, but also in Berlin and Brussels.

A trilemma with no easy solution

The attempt to find a middle way is understandable, because all three options come with costs. Although the transatlantic approach provides security, it also leaves us vulnerable to political and digital blackmail. European sovereignty promises independence, but it exceeds the continent’s current capabilities. Global alliances sound appealing, but without leadership and institutions they remain fragile.

What Europe certainly needs is a more honest debate about the cost of its complacency to date. The reliance on US technology was no accident, but the result of decades of political decisions. New decisions require the same staying power. The trilemma won’t be resolved overnight. But acknowledging it is the first step.

In concrete terms, this means that Europe must simultaneously invest in its own digital capacities, build strategic partnerships, and remain realistic about what is and is not possible in the short term. Full digital sovereignty is not a realistic short-term goal. But reduced dependency is possible, provided the political will exists. What is missing is not the blueprint, but a European consensus on the direction of travel.

This article was first published in German on boell.de.