Migration policy: EU increasingly outsources responsibility for asylum

Externalizing asylum responsibility is still being hailed as a key instrument, if not indeed the solution to the EU’s “migration question” - from processing asylum claims off territory to providing neighbouring countries with aid and monetary incentives to host refugees to full-scale offshoring of migrants to third countries with which they have no actual ties. Despite growing evidence that such deals offer no sustainable solution (see the notorious EU-Turkey Declaration or the intended deal with Tunesia struck in summer 2023) or are not, in face, practically feasible (e.g. various European governments’ botched attempts to offshore asylum seekers to Rwanda), both heads of state and the EU commission continue to consider such “partnerships” with third countries a viable solution to growing anti-refugee sentiment, the rise of right-wing populist parties and deteriorating social cohesion across Europe.

First off, their starting point of analysis is not wrong. The current state of the European Union’s asylum system indeed reveals significant structural weaknesses and inherent inequities that undermine its efficacy and fairness. The Dublin Regulation, which was designed to allocate responsibility for asylum applications to the member state of first entry, has largely failed to function as intended. As a result, asylum systems in countries at the EU’s external borders, such as Italy and Greece, were disproportionately burdened by migrant arrivals, bearing the brunt of asylum claims, while other member states have continued to evade their responsibilities.

Unequal distribution leads to “race to the bottom”

This unequal distribution of pressure has engendered a lack of solidarity among EU member states, leading to what can be described as a “race to the bottom”. Member states such as Denmark, Greece, and Hungary have implemented increasingly restrictive policies, either by suspending asylum processing or lowering reception standards for asylum seekers, inducing the latter to circumvent these countries or travel further to Northern and Western EU member states. Over the last years, this has exacerbated the challenges faced by countries that continue to uphold their asylum commitments, including, above all, Germany and Austria: Between 2014 and 2023, more than half of all positive asylum decisions in the EU were issued in Germany and Austria, while in the same period, Hungary received less than 100 applications per year. The result is an environment in which the responsibility for managing migration and processing asylum claims is unevenly shared, further entrenching disparities across the EU and threatening cohesion.

In response to these challenges, some member states have resorted to the construction of physical barriers, with the number of border walls now exceeding those erected during the Cold War. A case in point is the Serbian-Hungarian border, fortified with a double-layer barbed wire fence and heavily guarded by border police and drones. Yes, there is little evidence to suggest that such measures effectively reduce migrant numbers. Moreover, the shift from comprehensive European solutions to a reliance on bilateral agreements – such as those established between Italy and Libya, Italy and Albania (see below), and Rwanda and the UK or Germany – signals a troubling trend towards fragmentation within the EU. Such agreements undermine the principles of unity and cohesion that the EU is built upon, creating parallel structures that could further isolate member states from one another. As a result, the European Union risks drifting further apart, as individual nations prioritize national interests over collective responsibility.

European ‘refugee crisis’ of the last ten years was and is essentially a political crisis.

Additionally, asylum and migration policies have increasingly been leveraged as tools in negotiations with third countries, with development aid often contingent upon “migration prevention” efforts. This “sticks-and-carrots” approach sees migration as a mere transaction between countries, diminishing the rights of refugees and diffusing responsibility for violations of international law or humanitarian obligations. Prioritizing conditionality in migration and development cooperation poses severe ethical dilemmas and may undermine the key principles of international asylum law, ultimately detracting from the EU’s commitment to human rights and solidarity.

The rise of right-wing populist parties across EU reflects how the ongoing issues within the EU’s asylum system necessitate urgent reform to address its inequities and inefficiencies. European ‘refugee crisis’ of the last ten years was and is essentially a political crisis fuelled by the lack of solidarity between EU member states. Without a concerted effort to foster genuine solidarity among member states, the system will continue to falter, further jeopardizing the rights of those seeking refuge and the cohesion of the Union itself. Only a common European solution can distribute the pressure more fairly across the entire EU, relieve national reception capacities in some countries and close implementation gaps in others. This is an increasingly urgent topic for EU policy makers because beyond the evident and stark effects of externalization strategies within the Union, there are also notable spillover effects on Europe’s role in the world and its position towards third countries.

Implications and long-term effects of externalization

The externalization of asylum procedures by the EU carries profound implications for its credibility and diplomatic standing, particularly within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as the Global South. By outsourcing its asylum responsibilities, Europe risks undermining its self-proclaimed image as a “regulatory superpower.” This raises critical questions regarding its ability to advocate for a rules-based international order while simultaneously abdicating its responsibilities to protect vulnerable populations by outsourcing them to West Africa, the Balkans or the MENA region.

Furthermore, externalization creates vulnerabilities within the EU’s foreign policy framework. Third countries that host refugees gain significant leverage, rendering the EU susceptible to coercion in any diplomatic negotiation, irrespective of migration issues. This dynamic can lead to the instrumentalization of migrants, wherein third states manipulate the flow of refugees to extract concessions from the EU. Such a scenario not only complicates diplomatic relations but also reflects a broader weakness in the Union’s approach to migration, suggesting a troubling willingness to be “threatened” by the arrival of a dozen refugees. The ongoing, unresolved situation at the Polish-Belarussian border has been exemplary of this dynamic since winter 2021, with no solution in sight. Suspending asylum law altogether, as now proposed by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, seems more indicative of political despair and pandering to right-wing voters rather than a confident, rules-based European answer. 

Externalizing asylum policies inadvertently legitimizes authoritarian regimes and questionable security actors.

This is a troubling development not only with regards to migrants’ rights, but also for the EU’s security and geopolitical power. Externalizing asylum policies inadvertently legitimizes authoritarian regimes and questionable security actors, including Frontex (with an annual budget of € 922 million EUR in 2024 the EU’s most expensive agency by far) and for-profit security and technology companies. The result is a diffusion of responsibility that complicates accountability, making it increasingly challenging to identify specific culprits when human rights abuses occur. As the EU cedes control over asylum decisions to these external actors, it diminishes its own authority and influence, thereby weakening its position on the global stage.

Moreover, the consequences of such policies are evident in the secondary movements of refugees initially hosted in countries like Turkey. Rising xenophobic sentiment and hate crimes against Syrians refugees have compelled many of them to migrate further to the EU. The EU-Turkey Deal, intended as a comprehensive solution, has merely postponed the underlying issues (if at all), resulting in a temporary alleviation of pressure rather than a sustainable resolution. Western and Northern EU member states hosting these new arrivals face heightened challenges for their economic and social integration, as many recently arrived Syrians display worse physical and mental health, lower educational attainment and a lower socio-economic background than previous cohorts, stemming from their protracted displacement, which UNHCR defines as situations “in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile.”  The effects of this state of limbo are not only, and most severely, felt by the refugees themselves, but also by their eventual host communities. 

The Italy-Albania deal raises numerous legal, ethical, and practical challenges

Similar outcomes could emerge from agreements such as the Italy-Albania deal, suggesting that externalization strategies ultimately fail to address the root causes of migration and displacement. Italy’s deal with the EU candidate country Albania has only recently become operational, with multiple delays raising concerns about its viability and effectiveness. Initially projected to open in early 2024, the centres’ setbacks suggest that the implementation process is fraught with complications. Yet, Giorgia Meloni’s initiative has garnered interest even from the United Kingdom and its new Labour government.

First and foremost, the deal comes with considerable legal challenges, as the reception centres in Shengjin and Gjader are meant to operate under Italian jurisdiction, effectively sidelining Albanian authorities. Constitutional experts have raised concerns regarding the legality of this arrangement; however, the Albanian Constitutional Court has approved the project, underscoring a significant tension between legal frameworks and political expediency. The ambitious timeline for processing asylum applications – requiring decisions within 28 days, including appeals – raises questions about its adherence to basic principles of the rule of law. The feasibility of such expedited procedures, given the complexity of asylum claims, appears overly ambitious and may undermine the due process rights of applicants.

Concerns also extend to the treatment of rejected asylum seekers. The prospect of returning individuals to their countries of origin presents significant practical and logistical challenges, and deportations from Albania may not be any easier than those from Italy. An accumulating number of rejected, but not yet deported asylum seekers could soon lead to overcrowded camps, which would quickly devolve into inadequate living conditions (cue the familiar scenarios from the camp Moria on the Greek island Lesbos and similar EU hotspots) and motivate the secondary movement of migrants through neighbouring Montenegro into the EU. Clearly, such (very likely) outcomes would reflect a failure to establish a common and sustainable approach to address refugee arrivals.

Additionally, the deal stipulates that only male migrants from “safe countries” will be transported to Albania, when intercepted by the Italian coast guard at sea. The deal explicitly excludes women, children and vulnerable populations, yet how exactly vulnerability will be assessed in high-stress situations on crammed boats and dinghies remains, so far, unanswered. The arbitrary nature of such deliberations could lead to significant injustices and exacerbate the plight of those seeking refuge.

Furthermore, the conditions within the reception centres in Albania appear to be deeply problematic. Asylum seekers would be effectively imprisoned, unable to leave the facilities, which in Gjader are situated on a former military base and intentionally isolated from the local population. This lack of interaction not only contravenes principles of community integration but may also foster hostility among locals, many of whom already seem to oppose the initiative. Such opposition can exacerbate anti-migrant sentiment, further marginalizing those seeking safety and fuelling right-wing populist resentment.

Finally, the deterrence effect of the deal remains questionable. With only 3,000 spots available for asylum seekers, there is little assurance that an influx of migrants to Italy will be adequately managed. If migration numbers exceed this limit, any additional individuals will remain in Italy, thereby negating the intended deterrent effect of the agreement. Hence, the deal raises numerous legal, ethical, and practical challenges that jeopardize its intended objectives. Without significant adjustments and considerations for the humanitarian and legal implications of such arrangements, it risks perpetuating rather than resolving the EU’s migration question. 

In view of an increasing number of such bilateral deals with third countries and the EU’s general orientation towards externalisation as a viable migration policy instrument, it is paramount to 

• (a) strive for a critical evaluation of European countries’ reliance on external partnerships to “curb migration” and 
• (b) to prioritize comprehensive, humane approaches to migration that uphold international law and the dignity of refugees. 

The long-term effects of externalization on the EU includes diminished credibility, increased vulnerability to coercion, and the legitimization of an authoritarian, deterrence-focused stance on migration control. These developments pose significant challenges not only to the integrity of the Union’s asylum policies but also to its broader commitment to human rights and solidarity, both internationally and between member states. To navigate these complexities, the new EU commission will have to reevaluate its approach to (forced) migration, emphasizing responsibility-sharing and the upholding of humanitarian principles – for its own sake as much as for that of people seeking international protection.