The 2024 EP elections are marked by a context much less favourable to the environmentalist agenda. In 2019, the European elections were held in the midst of massive global climate strikes and marches, and the so-called Green Wave reflected those concerns. What is the situation today? Is there a vision of peri-urban ecology and what is the impact of EU policies on these areas with specific needs?
With two weeks to go before the European elections, the Rassemblement National (RN), the leading far-right party in France, founded by the Le Pen family, is set to take first place, with a significant lead over the list of candidates backed by the current president.
This electoral prospect, while not new (the RN list came out on top in 2019, but was only one point ahead of the list backed by Emmanuel Macron), underlines the ever-increasing entrenchment of the far right in the French political landscape. Furthermore, a crucial aspect of the 2024 elections is that they are much less favourable to the environmental agenda. In 2019, the European elections were held in the wake of the first climate strikes and marches, and the Greens’ results were strongly affected.
The far right and territorial tensions
In 2024, anti-environmentalist attitudes have spread and the farmers' movement (several blockades of major motorways and government buildings) has challenged, against the wishes of a large part of the industry, the few environmental advances made in recent years at the European and national levels (despite this opposition being contested/disputed by a large part of workers in the same industry/sector). Another contentious topic, which receives less media coverage but affects the daily lives of a large proportion of the population, is the ban of sales of new combustion-powered vehicles, scheduled for 2035 under the European Green Deal.
By addressing the issue of people's mobility, the European Union's roadmap is putting back on the table an issue that has previously provoked a very strong backlash against the French government, in 2018, with the Gilets Jaunes [Yellow Vests] movement. Tens of thousands of citizens, most of whom had never been activists before, took to the streets and roundabouts of France’s cities, weekend after weekend. This social movement, which was caused by the announced increase carbontaxes on fuel, has since continued to impact the debates about the ecological transition’s implementation. This movement raised the question of the ability of millions of citizens who do not live in city centres to get around and go to work.
These issues seem to be the political driving force behind the rise of the RN. However, this figure should be taken with a pinch of salt: according to a survey conducted by the polling agency Elabe[1], after the 2022 presidential elections, 41% of people who identified as taking part in Gilets Jaunes activities (as opposed to those merely supporting these actions) had voted for Marine Le Pen in the first round of elections.
More specifically, the question raised here is that of territorial inequalities, which is often a key theme in social disparities. The political divide between different parts of the country is such that certain rural areas, for example in the north of France or in the east, former mining and steel manufacturing areas, have become strongholds of the extreme right. This resulted in the election of 89 RN deputies in the 2022 legislative elections despite the voting system being highly unfavourable to the opposition (with no proportional representation in the legislative elections).
Is this just a momentary wave of protest? Some recent studies, including a notable one by the sociologist Benoit Coquard[2], have highlighted the political shift taking place in certain rural areas, where the social norm, which makes and breaks local reputations - essential for finding a job or building one's social circle - is transforming voting for Le Pen into something respectable. It is how small businesses owners, and those succeed only thanks to hard work and their own merit now vote. In these areas, being progressive-oriented or a supporter of the Greens can create reputational difficulties. We are therefore witnessing new situations of political hegemony.
But does this mean we should succumb to the idea that the ecological transition will necessarily create “losers”, and that these “losers” will have no alternative but to vote for the RN?
Of course not. However, we do need to take the time to immerse ourselves in the day-to-day lives of French people, to consider their difficulties, their aspirations and their demands, to try to identify a progressive perspective. The Fondation de l'Écologie Politique recently published L'écologie depuis les ronds-points [Ecology from the Roundabouts], a series of interviews and notes on the Gilets Jaunes movement. It certainly has a lot to teach all those who are advocating a green transition on the eve of the European elections.
Drawing lessons from a movement that originated in the suburban areas
The story of the European Green Deal, made possible by the strong climate mobilisation that took place in late 2018 and early 2019, and that of the Gilets Jaunes movement, are interconnected; rather than opposed to one another. This is what emerges from several research studies that shine a light on French society, beyond the declinist political narratives that would have us believe that social and territorial divides are inevitable. These and other works help us to answer the following questions: who were those Gilets Jaunes? Was what we witnessed a revolt by the suburbs against the metropolitan city centres? What was the Gilets Jaunes' attitude towards green issues?
The politicisation of the familiar
The geographer Etienne Walker has studied the geography of the Gilets Jaunes movement and tried to question the link between the geographical areas of engagement and of residence; and the form of mobilisation. On 17 November 2018, 90% of the participants lived within 20 km of the site of the rally. 47% lived within 5 km of it. The areas initially occupied, roundabouts, motorway slip roads, etc., are part of the daily routine of hundreds of thousands of French families. These nearby areas, previously considered depoliticised, were the scene of a new political and social commitment for many of the participants. They organised their occupation, the making of their demands, with their own know-how, outside the sometimes pre-established framework of social mobilisation.
A revolt by those forced to use their car
The Gilets Jaunes movement was suburban: 37% to 40% of those surveyed resided in suburban areas, according to the INSEE definition. Large numbers of people coming from inner city areas also accompanied them. What almost all of them had in common was a lifestyle in which the use of a car played a central role. As the mobilisations shifted to the prefectures and the centres of the big cities, this social make-up changed significantly: the participants were joined and replaced by those living there, who are more affected by the cost of housing, and less by the cost of transport. These mobilisations must therefore be part of an analysis of the consequences of spatial planning and public policies, which have organised millions of lives around and for the attractiveness of the biggest cities.
Not poor, but living on a tight budget
The sociologist Pierre Blavier, who published Gilets Jaunes: la révolte des budgets contraints [Gilet Jaunes: the Revolt of Those on Tight Budgets], studied the daily lives of a couple who are representative of those who mobilised on 17 November 2018. José and Sylvie are not poor. They now own a small bungalow and both are wage-earning employees. However, they do live on a very tight budget. Once they have paid everything that needs to be paid at the beginning of the month, they only have 8% of their income left. So they practise something called System D. When their workday as employees ends, the work they do for themselves and for others begins. Vegetable gardening, car repairs, home renovation, DIY, self-help. José and Sylvie do not lack the resources needed to act, invest and maintain themselves; but this means sacrificing the odd weekend, and not always being able to go on holiday. And that has an effect in terms of wear and tear on the body.
The car and the cost of electronics
One of the most worrying and restrictive costs are car repairs and maintenance. The increased use of electronics, in particular, is heavily criticized. A few years ago, a damaged rear-view mirror could be repaired by a relative with some mechanical skills. With electrification, such a viable option no longer exists. You need different skills, and more expensive tools. The ability to do things for oneself and not depend on the commercial sector has become limited. And costs have gone up.
No more anti-green than the rest of society
Magali Della Sudda, a historian, sociologist, and CNRS research fellow, is currently coordinating the main research project on the Gilets Jaunes in France. Academics from all over France contributed to the project, based on several surveys conducted using questionnaires and interviews. Alix Levain, who leads the ecology area of research in this project, and Simon Persico, provide a precise answer to the question: were the Gilets Jaunes anti-ecologists? The answer is no, at least no more or no less than the average French citizen if we refer to the ADEME 2018 barometer. At the time, around 8% of French people and the Gilets Jaunes put environmental issues at the top of their list of concerns[3].
A feeling of being dispossessed
But that should not detract from the fact that the relationship of the Gilets Jaunes to these issues is mixed and that ecological questions are divisive. Many of them, open to ecological issues, express a feeling of being politically dispossessed. This feeling is characterised by the coexistence of sustainable practices, particularly consumption-wise, albeit constrained by the price of organic produce, and at the same time a rejection of the various forms of eco-citizen labels, seen as signs of symbolic domination.
Lessons for the Ecological Transition in France and Europe
The first lesson can be formulated as a question. What has been done since November 2018 to question the dynamics of metropolisation that justified this regional planning, a particular distribution of jobs, income inequalities, or the central role played by the car in the lives of millions of individuals? The subject has received little attention in France. Perhaps because it’s discouraging to question fifty years of regional planning, public policy and economic growth at all costs. And yet, that is one of the major political projects of the period.
Many have quietly raised the alarm on reconciling ecology and social justice – something we need to listen and think about. They are worried about the implementation of ETS 2, i.e the extension of the European carbon market to individual fuels and heating. The idea is to apply a form of carbon tax to the price of petrol, which is supposed to increase over time, while fluctuating on the basis of unpredictable market dynamics. While the scheme is now accompanied by a transfer (through a social transition fund), it is important to remember that the Gilets Jaunes movement highlighted the ineffectiveness of redistribution strategies. These strategies are unpopular, because complicated and sometimes widely staggered over time – between the payment at the pump and investments in the daily public transport – leaving several years to go by. This extension of the carbon market to private individuals, which draws no lessons from the Gilets Jaunes movement, and whose implementation is scheduled for 2027, represents a major social and political risk, at a time when opposition to the ecological transition and the Green Deal is on the rise.
The lesson of the Gilets Jaunes movement is threefold regarding the use of taxation to change practices as far as individuals are concerned:
Even if it is predictable (which is not the case with ETS 2), a tax increaseon a product that has a fluctuating price is not effective. The Gilets Jaunes movement came before the carbon tax increase, but after a 25% rise in the price of oil on the international market. Higher taxes on consumption cannot accompany, and most importantly cannot finance, accommodating policies for the wealthiest or multinationals. Finally, taxation cannot replace the the following tools: the budgeting, /subsidies and the necessary public investment. Pursuing the Green Deal without calling into question the European Stability and Growth Pact will get us nowhere.
The second lesson to learn can take can be formulated as an observation: the Gilets Jaunes were not, for the most part, below the poverty line, but were more likely to be between the 3rd and 6th decile of the population in terms of income. However, several ecological transition aid schemes sometimes seem to be out of step with the needs and practices of these households. We can observe the example of aid for thermal renovation of housing. Fortunately, aid has increased in recent years, before being cut back very recently under the guise of combating excessive deficits. These subsidies are conditional on the use of RGE-certified companies (Environmentally friendly label). To say nothing of the inflationary effects, nor the relative availability of these companies, the current system leaves little room for the practice of self-renovation, a widespread practice among middle-class households Is that not depriving ourselves of the energy and financial resources needed to accelerate the renovation of our housing stock?
We also need to question the aim of purchase subsidies, particularly for less polluting car. Due to the sociology of new car buyers, they favour the upper social classes; whereas taxation affects everyone, particularly the owners of older and high-consumption vehicles. France's experience with "social leasing" makes it possible to target subsidies to the most vulnerable populations, while encouraging European car manufacturers to prioritise the production of smaller, more ecologically and socially useful vehicles. Targeting these subsidies correctly helps to limit inefficient or excessively redistributive public spending on the most affluent.
The third lesson concerns the car. In 1973, in L'idéologie sociale de la bagnole [The Social Ideology of the Car], André Gorz wrote: "This vehicle, in other words, was going to force him to consume and use a host of market services and industrial products that only third parties could provide. The apparent autonomy of the car owner concealed his radical dependence." As the proportionate share of electronics in cars has risen (from less than 10% of the build price in the 1970s to 40% by 2020), the autonomy of motorists has continued to come under attack, as they can no longer easily repair their vehicles themselves. With the advent of electrification, there is a real risk that this constraint will become stronger, and with it, the chains of dependency. Not necessarily because of the battery, but because of the size of the vehicles and the electronics. What emerges is a political battleground for a car that is repairable, accessible and reintegrated among other possible practices and ways of getting around. There is no sanctimonious approach here. Rather there is the need to build a balance of power not only with car manufacturers, but also with leasing companies and car fleet owners, who today are responsible for buying 50% of all new vehicles put on the road in France, and therefore eventually on the second-hand market.
The latest social movements, be it the Gilets Jaunes or the farmers' movement, are fuelling the rhetoric of those who oppose the ecological transition. They also explain the government's reticence to act ?. However, while the research highlights the deep-seated dynamics of an increasingly openly anti-environmental far right, other research puts the divisions into perspective and identifies issues that can bring together these parts of society that some would like to see permanently divided. However, while these prospects are reassuring, they are an invitation to rethink certain public policies and political priorities, so that the green transition is also thought out by and for the middle and working classes in rural and suburban areas.
This article first appeared here: fr.boell.org
The views and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union.
