Brexit and Britain’s Indo-Pacific tilt may have convinced Germany that the UK is no longer interested in defence co-operation, writes James Rogers. That would be a mistake. The two can build on each other’s strengths in NATO and in the defence of Ukraine.
Listen to some analysts, and you might think the British have gone mad. The raucous post-Brexit debate in the UK spilled over from the UK and spread across Europe. Angela Merkel, the former German Chancellor, even asked if Germany could still ‘depend’ on the British.
Are those doubts still valid? That depends on one’s perspective. For many German (and British) elites, Britain’s withdrawal from the EU was a bruising experience, upending 40 years of cooperation. Withdrawing from the EU certainly created a period of flux and political instability in Britain.
Global Britain and the Integrated Review
But Brexit forced Britain to fundamentally review its global interests and strategy during a period of profound economic and geopolitical upheaval. This appraisal resulted in the Integrated Review in March 2021, the broadest evaluation of British foreign, security and defence policy in a generation. The review was backed up with substantial increases in defence investment, amounting to over £16.5bn on top of £7.6bn promised during the 2019 election. The Integrated Review put flesh on the bones of ‘Global Britain’, a term which emerged in the aftermath of Brexit. Contrary to popular belief, Global Britain was never intended to stand in opposition to Europe or the Euro-Atlantic. In fact, the Integrated Review stated:
The precondition for Global Britain is the safety of our citizens at home and the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, where the bulk of the UK’s security focus will remain…The UK will be the greatest single European contributor to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area to 2030.
Britain has already made good on this pledge. Since mid-2021, the UK has been at the forefront of European security. By critiquing European energy policy, releasing intelligence, and delivering weapons to Ukraine prior to the renewed Russian invasion, Britain has sought to shape the European environment to frustrate Russia and ensure Kyiv is not forced into defeat. By retaining military forces in Germany, while continuing to lead in terms of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s Enhanced Forward Presence, the UK has taken measures to boost the defence of the continent.
Furthermore, Britain remains the only country to designate its nuclear forces in defence of NATO allies, and it has more forces permanently deployed to more locations in Europe – including Norway, Estonia, Poland, Gibraltar, and the island of Cyprus – than any other European power. It also sends forces to Iceland, Lithuania, and Romania each year in support of the Icelandic, Baltic, and Black Sea air policing missions. And in May last year, the UK was the only country to issue security assurances to Finland and Sweden while they applied to join NATO.
But the Integrated Review raised Britain’s ambitions beyond Europe. It declared:
By 2030… [the UK] will be deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific as the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence in support of mutually beneficial trade, shared security and values.
Building on this ambition – known as the ‘“tilt” to the Indo-Pacific’, the UK became a ‘Dialogue Partner’ of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in August 2021 and formed AUKUS with Australia and the US a month later, creating what may well become one of the defining international formations of the 21st century. Throughout late 2021 and the first part of 2022, the UK deployed a carrier strike group to the Pacific Ocean and stationed two patrol vessels to Southeast Asia, to demonstrate British naval reach and interoperability with allies and key partners. The Royal Navy remains the only large navy other than the US to have challenged illegitimate Chinese claims over islands in the South China Sea.
In May 2023, the UK signed the Hiroshima Accord with Japan, creating a geopolitical framework as close to an alliance one can get without having a mutual defence clause. Two months later, Britain joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, becoming the second largest economy in an economic arrangement with among the fastest economic growth in the world.
What this shows is that, unlike some other countries, the UK does not see the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific as disconnected theatres. The fact that Britain sees the two regions as entwined means the country is at the vanguard of an intellectual shift. This was reflected in the Integrated Review Refresh (IRR) of March 2023, commissioned by the government to update the Integrated Review in light of Russia’s renewed push into Ukraine. This review of the 2021 review embraced the geopolitical concept of the ‘Atlantic-Pacific’: through a proactive shaping strategy, the UK government seeks to bind the two regions together to the advancement of free and open countries everywhere.
More than just Global Britain
It should be noted that the IRR mentioned ‘Global Britain’ only once, and even then only in passing reference to the original Integrated Review. This does not mean that the UK’s new geostrategy has changed in terms of substance. Nor does it necessarily imply that it will change fundamentally in the future. Recent speeches by David Lammy, the shadow Foreign Secretary, and John Healey, the shadow Defence Secretary, show that the Labour party – which leads the polls – is deeply committed to resisting Russia and galvanising European support for Ukraine. Lammy pledged support for Britain’s growing partnership with Japan, as well as AUKUS. Given that the Australian Labor party is in power in Australia, it is hard to believe that the British Labour party would seek to undermine a sister party in a close ‘Five Eyes’ partner.
A future Labour government in Britain might, however, seek tighter relations with the EU. Lammy and Healy have both called for a UK-EU security and defence pact, and for more structured relations. But the essential elements still need to be thought out. While a future British government may be prepared to join additional or new projects under Permanent Structured Cooperation – the UK has joined one already – it is unlikely that it would be willing to accept a junior or associate role in EU defence efforts. After all, Britain brings a lot to the table, being a nuclear power with Europe’s most powerful navy, a considerable air force, and a slew of overseas military bases.
British-German relations in the new age of geopolitics
Chancellor Olaf Scholz's announcement of the Zeitenwende in 2022 gave rise to hopes among British strategists that Germany would begin to meet its strategic commitments. This is still the case; the IRR mentioned Germany seven times. The original Integrated Review proclaimed that the UK saw ‘Germany is an essential ally, with which we have deep economic ties and a growing foreign policy partnership’.
However, Germany’s National Security Strategy, published in June 2023, did not mention Britain (though other partners, such as France and the US, were cited). Of course, this does not necessarily reflect the state of relations between London and Berlin, but it does signal that exhausted narratives of Britain’s ‘unreliability’ and ‘post-European turn’ still hold sway in Germany.
Towards a tighter British-German partnership?
Russia is a nuclear power with revisionist intent. Using subterfuge and force of arms, it has seized control of around one fifth of Ukrainian territory. The fact is, despite certain differences, Germany and the UK need each other. British nuclear and conventional forces intersect with one another to guarantee the defence of NATO. The UK may not have a nuclear posture as extensive as the US, but it is still potent. With the potential re-emergence of isolationism or Trumpism in the United States, it does no harm to have other options. Unlike France, the UK designates its nuclear deterrent to NATO and British conventional forces are deployed to support and extend its strategic posture.
Far from being an unreliable ally, Germany should see in the UK a committed and capable friend. In fact, the two countries should work more closely together. Germany’s focus on land forces and Britain’s naval strength complement one another admirably. If Germany can realise the Zeitenwende and make good on its military commitments, it will be in a strong position to strengthen security with the UK in Europe. Add in Poland and France, and the foundations exist for a stronger Europe.
So let Brexit bygones be bygones. It’s time to face the future. Germany and the UK need to work together.
