Viktor Orbán

The Hungarian political scene has never been more turbulent in the past 14 years. Since the start of the clemency scandal in early February, Fidesz has been unable to control the political narrative for months, despite its dominant position in power. The campaign leading up to the local and the European Parliament (EP) elections has been dominated by a new challenger, Péter Magyar, and his Respect and Freedom Party (Tisza) so far, although in recent weeks Fidesz has found its footing again.

Voters critical of the Orbán system are too diverse to be locked into a single camp. As it seems, it was an illusion to suggest that the majority of former Jobbik voters can vote on a list with center-left parties. The maneuvering space of the fifth Orbán government will only be limited by economic and foreign policy necessities; domestically, it has an easier job than ever before.

What might be done with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s political system after a potential opposition victory in 2022, considering that it is built mostly on informal power and privatized economic-financial resources? These questions are currently being debated mainly as issues of public law. Unfortunately, little is being said about the sociopolitical requirements for the democratic transition the opposition so desires.

Amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, the government-sponsored disinformation engine is operating at full capacity in Hungary, scapegoating and intimidating critical voices and triggering death threats against academics and intellectuals.

Hungary and Poland indicated in November that they would veto the European Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-2027 and the Next Generation EU (NGEU) economic recovery fund. However, recent developments indicate that Hungary’s and Poland’s views on the matter have diverged. What does Budapest stand to gain by using its veto?