If smart politics and scientific evidence went hand-in-hand, decarbonisation would be understood as a political issue that transcends party lines, and as a strategy for economic development. Yet in the run-up to the European elections, a political division over precisely this issue seems to be emerging, both at an EU level and within the various member states.
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There has never been such a broad consensus among the scientific community on a specific issue as there is today on man-made climate change, and the need to reduce emissions to guarantee growth in the future. In fact, 99% [1] of the world's scientists agree that climate change is caused by human activity. Consequently, if political thinking and scientific evidence went hand-in-hand, decarbonisation would be understood as a cross-cutting issue for all political forces, and an economic development strategy. Yet in the run-up to the European elections, a political division over precisely this issue seems to be emerging, both at an EU level and within the various member states.
Over the past few months, industrial policy, agriculture, debt and the distribution of wealth have all had the climate at their core in political debates. The proposal of the largest European climate strategy in decades, the European Green Deal, devised by the Von der Leyen Commission in 2019, shows that climate action not only consists of sectoral policies, but of a comprehensive socio-economic vision, which implies a new idea of the future. Since the launch of the European Green Deal, some twenty proposals have been developed as part of the Fit for 55 package, which raises the European ambition, and has very broad support within the European Parliament. More than 400 votes in favour in almost all votes on the individual measures show support from a cross-section of political forces, excluding the radical right (from the ECR and ID European political groups).
The Green Deal is also an industrial competitiveness strategy: in the face of massive Chinese and American investment in technological innovation, Europe is responding with its own vision of sustainable competitiveness. The Green Deal was ahead of its time and has allowed for a much more advanced regulatory framework than existed five years ago: we are better prepared than ever before to respond to global competition. EU climate policies also clarify Brussels' role in influencing member states' policy, and the importance of European negotiations. For example, the tractor protests have been focused on both national governments and Brussels, which showed how protestors view the importance of the EU in national policy-making. Looking at the Fit for 55 climate legislation in detail, national debates [2] have focused on the legislation that most affected the national imagination; energy efficiency in Germany or the automobile sector in Italy, as well as the EU ban on the sale of internal combustion engines from 2035. European policy has always influenced national policy, and vice versa, but tacking the climate crisis has been the clearest example.
A path full of real obstacles and illusory doubts
Public policymaking, and discussion of what is the best mix of technologies and sector-specific policies to achieve a given goal, is a healthy democratic process, but it sometimes risks being exploited to slow down legislative processes and economic change. In the past, parts of society and, consequently, some politicians have been open climate deniers, but now that there is almost complete agreement among climatologists; climate denial has given way to attempts to slow the green transition. Those who are sceptical about the transition and climate change often conceal conflicts of interest, dangerously polarising public debate, risking inaction and a consequent loss of competitiveness for European economies.
Across Europe, in recent months we have seen how the polarisation of the climate debate is at the centre of the “political tussle” and discussion between progressive and conservative forces. One of the most striking examples concerns the Nature Restoration Law, which was supposed to lead to a considerable increase in protected areas and remedy the fact that 80% of the EU’s ecosystems, on which the smooth functioning of its economy and society depends, are in a poor state of conservation. After a difficult journey through the European Parliament, which ended with the regulation being approved by 12 votes in the summer of 2023, the legislative process has proceeded with difficulty and is currently stuck in pre-electoral limbo.
The stalling, renegotiation and blocking of regulation and legislation in the EU is also causing market uncertainty. This is the case with the ban on the sale of cars with endothermic engines from 2035, or the CSDD (Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence) directive, which demands that companies pay attention to environmental standards at every stage of the production chain, and requires mandatory decarbonisation plans for large companies. Despite its approval, it has not been smooth, and there is still a feeling of uncertainty, which hurts companies and consequently workers. Typically in Brussels, after intense negotiations between Commission, Parliament and Council (trilogues), the final approval is merely a formal step. Today, legislative timeframes concerning energy are lengthening, and less and less certainty is being provided to citizens, businesses and investors, resulting in a stalemate that is not good for growth, among other things.
Green polarisation has also increased in Italy. As always, sharpened conflict does not go hand in hand with a sophisticated grasp of information, which is particularly necessary for these issues. The debate remains caged in slogans, and politics and the media lack the space for the cultural engagement that these kinds of issues should have. Moments of great importance in Italian politics, such as the Dubai Conference (COP28), or the Italy-Africa summit and the related Mattei Plan, have not been at the centre of the Italian cultural and political debate. This is harmful, given that these not only concern climate policies, but also industry, foreign policy, labour, and, in short, the role of Italy and Europe in the global balance of power.
A hostile environment
In the meantime, the environment has become a battleground and is talked about less and less. Campaign movements, which in recent years have played an important role in promoting these issues, have suffered the consequences of repressive crackdowns, especially in Italy. With the recent decree-law renamed Ddl eco-vandals [3], the penalties for those who deface or ruin public property have increased and can include fines of up to €40,000 and imprisonment of between 1 and 5 years. However much one may argue about the merit or agreeability of certain actions, there is no doubt that repressive rules do not facilitate dialogue, or the creation of spaces for discussion. Norms must be adaptable to any context. Ironically, only a few months later, faced with the farmers' protest, those who espoused the new laws found themselves disavowing them, realising that when faced with different protestors, public opinion and lawmaker opinion changed. What is important is that at the root of all protests is the demand for the development of a structured political proposal that looks at the welfare of people, and the needs of specific sectors.
The urgent need for confrontation and a faster pace on climate action is also expressed in other ways, which are largely a consequence of greater access to information. In recent years, we have witnessed a growth of climate lawsuits across Italy and Europe. The first in Italy, a civil lawsuit against the state brought by Giudizio Universale and signed by more than 200 plaintiffs, challenged the state's slowness in tackling the energy transition, and was deemed inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction. The case, although dismissed, highlighted the lack of any instrument with the force of law within the national legal system (which a climate framework law could constitute). This would allow people to take legal action to see their rights guaranteed at European and international level. Climate laws [4] are in place in almost all Western European countries, and make it possible to harmonise all national policies, starting with industrial, social, and labour policies for the achievement of climate goals. In Germany, thanks to the Climate Act, similar causes led the government to revise climate targets to bring them to speed with the urgency dictated by scientific evidence.
Not only the state, but also large companies, are increasingly being called to account over the adherence of their plans to climate targets. This is the case of ENI, the oil & gas giant in which the Italian state is a majority shareholder, which is currently facing a lawsuit [5] highlighting the discrepancy between climate targets and the company's short to medium-term investment plans. Regardless of the outcome of the lawsuits, these dynamics make clear the urgent call to deal with climate issues in a more comprehensive way, bringing all stakeholders to the table. The response of businesses, however, does not always match the cooperation and dialogue necessary to deal with complex issues, as witnessed by the increase in lawsuits, so-called SLAPP, which aim to silence the information and activity of associations deemed “hostile” [6].
Polarisation is only part of the story. As of 2022, we read in the Italian constitution that ‘The Republic protects the environment, biodiversity and ecosystems, also in the interest of future generations”. This is an era-defining change in the fundamental law of the state, and shows how the climate occupies an increasingly high position in the political and civil society agenda, with the possibility of progress that was unthinkable only a few years before. The structural implications of this change in the Constitution have yet to be assessed, but it is a great step forward towards the recognition of the importance of certain topics that until a few years ago were decidedly niche.
And from a more “concrete” perspective, Italy is making progress in terms of renewable energy installation: almost 6 GW in 2023, double the figure of 2022, and coming close to the commitments made at a European level (about 8GW per year). It is also at the forefront in key sectors for the energy transition. Italy, for example, is the country in Europe for the production of steel from recycling.
Going beyond campaign rhetoric, in Europe the Italian government has almost always voted in favour of renewables, energy efficiency and Green Deal targets. Out of 13 public votes on European climate legislation within the Fit for 55 package, Italy abstained only once. Given the large number of Italian parliamentarians in Brussels, Italy could have a decisive group of parliamentarians in deciding the composition of the new European Commission and determining how the EU will follow up on the Green Deal. According to projections, there is likely to be an increase in the strength of Europe's right-wing parties with a consequent reconsideration of EU priorities. In 2019, climate was listed as the third of four priorities, which led to the Green Deal and the dedication of 40% of National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) investments to the energy transition. Whether, after five years, climate will still feature in European strategic priorities will also depend on the Italian vote.
This year four billion people worldwide will go to the polls, making it a genuine crossroads in history. At such a time, and in the face of fragmentation and polarisation in the climate debate, the best solution is to resist simplifications, and restore the complexity that these issues deserve, putting them at the centre of public and political debate in a way that is healthy for our democracies.
[1] Mark Lynas et al (2021, 19 October) Greater than 99% consensus on human caused climate change in the peer-reviewed scientific literature. Environmental Research Letters
[2] Mathiesen K, Camut N, Weise Z., Cooper C.,Guillot L. (2024, 22 February) Bears, cars and angry farmers fuel green backlash. Politico
[3] Algostino A. (2024, 20 January) Ddl «eco-vandali»: l’egemonia della sicurezza contro la democrazia
[4] Giulia Colafrancesco G, Di Mambro C.(2023, 20 January) Una governance per il clima in Italia: Quali elementi per una legge quadro per il clima
[5] Greenpeace Italy (2023, 9 May) Causa civile contro ENI presentata da Greenpeace Italia, ReCommon e 12 cittadine e cittadini italiani: «L’operato della società peggiora la crisi climatica e viola i diritti umani»
[6] Greenpeace Italy (2024, 15 February) Il 16 febbraio c’è la prima udienza contro ENI
This article first appeared in Italian on fr.boell.org.
The views and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union.
