On 13 January 2024, Taiwan successfully conducted presidential and legislative elections. The people have shown that their hard-fought democracy is the one value everybody can agree on. There were no big surprises. The DPP won the presidency and now faces a divided parliament in which no party holds a majority. This article analyses what this means for Taiwan, as well as cross-strait and EU-Taiwan relations.
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The crowd was cheering in the midst of confetti fireworks. It was an exuberant atmosphere among the supporters of the winners. Elections are a huge spectacle in Taiwan. On 13 January 2024, the people went to the polls to vote for the new members of the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament, and, for the eighth time since 1996, a new president.
Election results: no big surprises
It was a three-party race this year. For the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has been in power for the last eight years under incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen, current vice president and DPP chairman, Lai Ching-te, ran together with Hsiao Bi-khim as his vice-presidential candidate, who was Taiwan’s representative in the US before entering the election campaign.
The Chinese Nationalist Party, Kuomintang (KMT), nominated Hou Yu-ih, mayor of New Taipei City and former police chief, and Jaw Shau-Kong, chairman of the Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC).
For the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which was only established in 2019, founder and chairman Ko Wen-je, former mayor of Taipei City, ran together with Wu Hsin-Ying, a member of the Legislative Yuan since 2022.
Terry Gou, businessman and Foxconn founder, later withdrew from the election campaign.
The voter turnout rate was at just under 72%, slightly lower than in 2020. Lai Ching-te from the DPP won, with a significant 40%. As a candidate only needs a plurality of votes in Taiwan, this was enough for Lai, and he won with a comfortable lead over KMT’s Hou Yu-ih, who received 33.5%.
Ko Wen-je from the TPP came in third, with a remarkable 26.5%, performing much better than many had previously expected for a party that nominated a presidential candidate for the first time.
As many had expected, the DPP lost its majority in parliament. The KMT became the largest party, with 52 seats, albeit only 1 seat ahead of the DPP, with 51 seats. The TPP won a total of 8 seats, an increase of 3 seats compared to 2020. But no party actually achieved a majority.
Achieving a third term in office for the ruling party is a first in Taiwan’s democratic history. The TPP’s performance is also noteworthy. The next few years will show whether TPP is able to capitalize politically on its power in parliament and whether Taiwan will shift more towards a three-party system.
Taiwan after the elections: continuity and (new) struggles
China framed the DPP and its candidates as ‘separatists’, and the KMT also used the narrative that the elections were ‘a choice between war and peace’. However, neither does the DPP pursue a ‘pro-independence policy’ nor the KMT a ‘pro-unification policy’. In fact, all three parties stand for ‘maintaining the status quo’; they just differ in how they want to achieve it.
Regarding cross-strait policy and international cooperation, Lai campaigned for a continuation of Tsai Ing-wen’s moderate course. His win has shown that people were not intimidated by China’s threats.
Domestically, the results, and especially the surprisingly good performance of the TPP, are a sign of dissatisfaction, particularly with the DPP’s ability to solve existing socio-economic problems, which were prominently featured in the campaigns. The KMT, however, was not able to directly translate this mood into an increase in votes for the presidency.
What the election results will mean for the future of the parties remains to be seen. All three have multiple reasons for self-reflection. What’s clear though is that with a divided parliament the next four years will definitely be difficult for Lai.
Cross-strait implications: stormy weather ahead?
Relations between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have become increasingly tense. After Tsai’s victory in 2016, Beijing terminated official dialogue, although Tsai and her government have signalled their willingness to talk and have pursued a cautious and balanced course.
Lai Ching-te has repeatedly emphasized that he is committed to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, wants to maintain the status quo and is open to dialogue and exchange.
It is, however, hardly conceivable that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would agree, as the CCP perceives Lai as ‘separatist’, and the DPP does not accept China’s preconditions for dialogue, namely the acceptance of its ‘One China Principle’. One question is whether there will be joint KMT and TPP legislative initiatives with regard to cross-strait issues that could have the potential for re-opening dialogue.
China has increased pressure on Taiwan for years, through coercive economic measures, international isolation of Taiwan, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks or military intimidation measures.
Militarily, the PLA’s aircraft entering Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) or crossing the median line have become the new normal. This further increases the risk of miscalculations on both sides, and unintended accidents could spiral out of control.
There were many reports about an incredibly high level of disinformation campaigns trying to influence the elections. In the economic domain, China has imposed import bans and suspended tariff concessions on a range of products and threatens to further expand the scope. On the other hand, shortly before the elections, it lifted a previously imposed import ban for grouper fish, which was perceived by many as an attempt to positively influence potential KMT voters.
However, China’s strategy is not only about threats. Its ‘toolbox’ comprises a ‘carrots and sticks’ approach.
Positive incentives include, for example, more scholarships for Taiwanese students or measures benefiting Taiwan’s businesses. In September 2023, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council jointly published a new document in which Fujian, the province closest to Taiwan, was made a so-called ‘cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone’, which involves creating incentives for greater economic and social integration and closer ties.
For business and social groups that are closer to the KMT, those measures might result in some positive benefits. But their effectiveness for the broader society is likely to be rather low.
Lai Ching-te was not Beijing’s preferred candidate. However, although Beijing’s initial reactions via the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were rhetorically harsh, they did not deviate from longstanding arguments. Military intimidation activities, as described above, have not significantly increased on or after election day, but have also not diminished either. Perhaps current efforts by the United States and China to stabilize their relationship have had an impact on the reactions.
From the CCP’s perspective, the lack of a majority for the DPP, as well as the KMT’s good performance in the local elections in November 2022, may keep some hope that there is still a window of opportunity for more rapprochement, at least with some parts of Taiwan’s society.
There was one immediate show of force though. Just two days after the elections, Nauru cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan. And shortly afterwards, rumours spread that Tuvalu, another Pacific island and remaining diplomatic partner, could also switch sides. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has rejected those speculations, but during Tsai Ing-wen’s presidency alone, China has persuaded 10 countries to sever ties with Taiwan. There are only 12 diplomatic partners left now.
For the near future, the period before and after Lai’s inauguration on 20 May is highly sensitive. Spring is the season when China conducts its annual military exercises in the region. It’s not clear yet when further economic coercive measures will be taken. China will watch closely how Lai is planning to set cross-strait policies for the years ahead and will calibrate its strategy accordingly.
EU–Taiwan: unofficial relations, like-minded partners
The language seemed somewhat odd in the congratulatory messages from Europe after the elections.
While Italy ‘welcomed the elections’, and Germany and France ‘congratulated voters, candidates and those elected’, the EU’s External Action Service (EEAS) only ‘congratulated all the voters who participated in this democratic exercise’. None of them mentioned the name of the winner.
In comparison, other countries, such as the US, the UK, Australia and Japan, were less restrained. In the Czech Republic, it was President Pavel himself who congratulated via a media interview. Russia, not surprisingly, fully repeated China’s stance. And according to the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, many other countries also reaffirmed China’s language, including, from the EU, Hungary.
The EU’s statements were clearly compromises, between those voices that are afraid to be perceived as ‘provocative’, and those who think it is important to not let China dictate the EU’s One China policies, a sign that EU–Taiwan relations, although unofficial, have significantly evolved in recent years.
Close economic and trade ties, as well as shared values and, in particular, China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the region and (especially) towards Taiwan, are the drivers for this.
The EU knows that a crisis in the Taiwan Strait would have huge geopolitical and economic impacts, globally and at home. It would affect trade routes, supply chains and investments. Peace and stability in the region, therefore, is a core interest.
It is to be seen in this context that the EU, and especially the European Parliament (EP), has been very active in shaping the relations.
In October 2021, the Parliament passed the first ever ‘Recommendation on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation’, followed in mid-September 2022 by a resolution on ‘The situation in the Strait of Taiwan’. In the ‘Resolution on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations’, adopted in December 2023, the EP once again calls on the Commission and EEAS to ‘increase trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan through a formal bilateral agreement’.
China’s pressure on Taiwan will remain high. For the EU, this means it needs to monitor the situation closely. Even within the framework of the EU’s One China policy there is space to strengthen engagement with Taiwan. The Indo-Pacific strategy that integrated Taiwan as an important partner in the region provides a good platform.
The EU’s internal coordination is key and, together with partners, the EU should seriously prepare for different crisis scenarios and possible reactions. This applies not only to a major crisis; in situations when China distorts facts and narratives, the EU should also be able to jointly and quickly react. The EU also needs to have mechanisms in place to stand together in solidarity with Member States that become targets of China’s punishment tactics, like what we have seen in the case of Lithuania. That China has just suspended issuing visas to Lithuanian citizens was certainly not an accidental move.
Besides all the gloom, the EU should work with Taiwan in ways other than only through the ‘crisis lens’. Cooperation and exchanges in the fields of education, research and science could easily be further expanded. Taiwan’s civil society, as well as its art and culture scene, are truly inspiring. For Europeans, there is a lot to learn about, and from, Taiwan.
However, there are two important markers this year that will have an effect on Taiwan. The EU’s elections in June might lead to a more right-wing Europe. And regarding the forthcoming elections in the US, Taiwan’s most important partner, a potential second Trump presidency would be the biggest unpredictability, not only for Taiwan but also for China.
Proud democrats
Taiwan’s people have shown, to themselves and to the world, that their hard-fought democracy is something precious and that they are proud of it. And rightly so. Compared with previous elections, it certainly was one that has never before been so comprehensively covered in Europe.
In the end, on election day, everything was carried out transparently and orderly. The candidates who didn’t win conceded their defeat and congratulated the winner right away. On the huge stage, the winners were beaming with relief, although they did not look excessively enthusiastic. Perhaps they were just tired after a long and tough campaign period. Or maybe they knew that the real work will only start now. And they knew it is going to be quite messy. That’s how democracy is. Everywhere. But for Taiwan, there is much more at stake.
The views and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union.
