The (third phase of the) Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) faced an existential challenge in the crisis faced by Southern Europe economies (and some Eastern Europe economies), which had depression-like consequences in the affected countries and negatively impacted the entire European project.
The policy response to the crisis was essentially defined by the European Union (EU) governing institutions, in particular, by the European Council, the Governing Council of the ECB and the European Commission’s DG-ECFIN, and by the IMF. The European Parliament and stakeholder-based fora (like the European Economic and Social Council) played a marginal or even neglected role in the design and the supervision of the policy response to the crisis.
With this background in mind, it is necessary to think about how the Eurozone could be redesigned to enhance its chances of survival. The aim of this study is to contribute to a change in the EU economic policy and, in addition, to appraise the instruments and of scope of the EU institutional responses to economic crises.