No less than a week after presenting its ‘Communication on the Arctic Region’, the European Commission’s attempts at forging a coherent Arctic policy have already taken a knock back. On 25 November 2008, Greenland has voted in favour of further self-rule away from Denmark with 75% voting ‘yes’ in a vote that had a 72% turnout. This vote is of significant importance as the EU’s influence in the Arctic is in many ways contingent upon Denmark’s diminishing link to Greenland, one of the few Arctic coastal states encircling the North Pole together with Canada, Russia, Norway and the United States. Further independence for Greenland, so far the only country to have seceded from the EU, will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the European Union’s influence in the Arctic.
The increasing grip on the region by the Arctic coastal states, whose recent meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, took place to the detriment of other non-coastal Arctic countries including EU member-states Finland and Sweden, lends the recent developments in Greenland particular relevance. With their so-called ’Ilulissat Declaration’ these countries have rebuffed calls for a new comprehensive legal regime or international treaty for the Arctic, effectively attempting to insulate it from outside powers.
Indeed, the stakes are high. Climate change is melting the region’s ice caps, opening up access to fishing stocks, new shipping routes, which promise shorter distances for trade between Europe and East Asia, and substantial energy reserves. According to the recent US Geological Survey, the region could hold up to 13 percent of the world’s total undiscovered oil and about 30 percent of undiscovered natural gas. In today’s resource constrained world it is understandable that, while the Arctic coastal states are themselves quarrelling over these vast resources, their priority is first and foremost to ensure that no other actors can join this new ‘great game’ for the Arctic. These developments are significantly increasing the region’s conflict potential and its militarisation, threatening global security.
At the same time, however, the region’s unique ecosystem plays a significant role in terms of international environmental stability. A melting Arctic ice cap would lead to a dramatic rise in sea levels, which in turn would have serious global environmental, economic, and human security implications as far-reaching as the complete inundation of whole island states and subsequent mass migration. As such, the Arctic represents in many ways a ‘common good’, the relevance and responsibility of which stretches well beyond that of the Arctic states bordering the North Pole. It is in this context that the European Union must continue to stake its claim to the region.
The EU has stressed the region’s importance in its recent Arctic Communication, while Commissioners Piebalgs and Borg have acknowledged the need to tap its natural resources and Javier Solana has recognised the security problems a militarised Arctic could pose. Regrettably, however, the Commission has so far failed to clearly acknowledge the Arctic as a global ‘common good’.
Recognising the region as such, the European Union should advocate an international treaty governing the Arctic’s unique ecosystem and the sustainable management of its resources under the auspices of the United Nations. While one of the best regimes for the region would be one that mirrors the Antarctic Treaty, with its moratorium on resource extraction for at least 50 years, it is highly unlikely that such an arrangement will be accepted. This is not only because of the fundamental territorial and legal differences between the two, but particularly because energy security and international trade are agenda-setters and are likely to dispel any proposal for an arrangement in line with the Antarctic Treaty.
Such an international resource management regime could alleviate a ‘dash for resources’ and the region’s creeping militarisation and politicisation. The European Union, with its experience in shared sovereignty and history of shared resources as with the European Coal and Steel Community, must naturally occupy a key role in the establishment of such a regime.
Moreover, as global emissions have a direct impact on the region, with several studies forecasting temperature rises between 4 and 7 degrees Celsius by the end of this century, the protection of the Arctic region could also be embedded in a global climate change agreement.
While Greenland’s referendum on further self-rule might have been a setback for the EU’s own direct regional influence in the Arctic, the European Union must strive to ensure a future role in the region, rooted in a global context, and prevent the Arctic carve-up by the few.
Roderick Kefferpütz is responsible for Energy Policy at the EU Regional Office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, a think tank and policy network affiliated with the German Green Party.
Claude Weinber is the Director of the EU Regional Office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation.
This article was published in the European Voice on 08 January 2009.
The Heinrich Böll Foundation has published a recent policy paper entitled ‘Expanding the EU’s Institutional Capacities in the Arctic Region’. It can be downloaded at www.boell.eu