Towards a New German-Polish Partnership – An Assessment of Current Polish-German Relations
As demonstrated by numerous polls and the general political atmosphere in general, current relations between Poland and Germany can be considered very good. According to the newest data from the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research, 48% of Germans and 50% of Poles agree that Polish-German relations are good and have notably improved during the last few years.
The special relationship between Poland and Germany results mostly from the different ways of perceiving and evaluating each other as subjects of each other’s foreign policy. Although Germany is one of the most important partners in Poland's (European) foreign policy, Poland does not enjoy a similar position in German policy and strategy. There are plenty of reasons for this asymmetry. There is a difference between economic and political potentials and lately also between structural capabilities, such as being part of the European Union or the eurozone. During the 1990s, the Polish-German community of values and interests manifested itself mostly as a well used opportunity, given to Poland and Germany thanks to Europe's transformation and Poland's political will to have an intensive dialogue with the Germans, not as a Polish-German agenda for Europe. Apart from the first part of the 1990's, when Germany considered the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe (Poland included) as a chance for the unification and democratisation of the East, while Poland saw the German reunification as a chance to redefine its geopolitics and enter European structures, the last 20 years of the (admittedly rather successful) dialogue and cooperation were not based on a perceived commonality of values and interests. The German side lacked the political will to start strategic talks with Poland, while the Polish side lacked ideas for cooperation. Poland waited. In the end of the 1990s the emptiness of bilateral talks was finally with the subject of the European Union.
Dialogue, 20 years after the Treaty
It is worth noting that in moments when external realities such as the war in Iraq or issues related to reforming the EU imposed a unified Polish-German agenda to some extent, it turned out that common interests meant common conflicts. Many times, differences in statements and views resulted from a lack of simultaneity and compatibility of identity discourses. These differences became necessary after the dynamic transformations of 1989 and beyond. The debate on expulsions showed differences in approaching history and ways of dealing with it, while the issue of the war in Iraq demonstrated a different approach to the United States. These discourses had a direct impact on goals set and instruments applied in foreign and European policies of both countries.
This year's July marked the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourhood and Friendly Cooperation between Poland and Germany. The anniversary turned out to be a good opportunity to sum up the state of Polish-German relations, both in the bilateral and the European sense. Both parties stressed that although the Treaty seems to be obvious today, it played a key part not only in the process of Polish-German reconciliation, but also in the integration of Poland into European structures. In fact, the Treaty created solid grounds for building trust between Poland and Germany, stressed the European focus of the young Polish democracy's foreign policy and created numerous instruments to increase a multi-level dialogue between both countries. Yet, despite this year's euphoria, the Treaty was not a genuine benchmark in Polish-German relations -especially in the 1990s- in the sense that it was not an invitation to political dialogue based on partnership and especially not to establishing regional cooperation. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Tusk is right when he states that Polish-German relations can be an example for the rest of Europe or even the rest of the world. This means that both sides of the Odra River recognise the importance of relations between Poland and Germany for the rest of the European Union, and, what is more, how important a partner Poland has become for Germany. The evidence for this state of affairs includes a list of projects that are to be carried out together, such as completing a common declaration of both governments. Never before have the Polish and German governments had a common ‘to do’ list and never before has the Bundestag exhorted the government in a resolution to create yearly reports on its implementation. The issue of the rights of Polish-speaking citizens of Germany has been resolved, although the German federal government made light of financing cultural activities of Poles living abroad, not to mention creating conditions to teach the Polish language. Two very important steps have been taken in order to implement the laws of both Poles living in Germany and Germans living in Poland with adequate symmetry. These steps include: planning a Centre for Documenting Polish Culture and History and a bureau for organisations of the Polish Diaspora as well as establishing plenipotentiaries dealing with learning Polish in every state.
A more efficient Poland is important for Berlin
Why is a common declaration by Polish and German governments on the occasion of the anniversary of signing the Treaty such an important document for both countries' relations? First of all, both governments have pledged to catch up on significant omissions, such as insufficient infrastructure: building bridges, modernising railroads with a high-speed railroad in the future and upgrading the gas and power grids. Furthermore, both sides have agreed to pursue common projects of tightening cooperation to improve crisis management abilities, rescue actions in case of flooding as well as law enforcement and crime prevention in areas close to the border. Secondly, a lot of stress was placed on viewing cooperation and economic exchange between the two countries as a driving force for improving mutual contact. Issues regarding economic innovation, also in the context of energy and climate change, were deemed important. Thirdly - a novelty in Polish-German dialogue - the dialogue is deeply anchored in the European context. This means that both countries will agree on their statements and create joint initiatives within the framework of the European Union. These initiatives are focused on further integrating Europe, but first and foremost on combating the financial crisis.
Therefore, the question arises: what inspired the German side to engage in such extensive cooperation with Poland, especially when it comes to political declarations? There are many possible answers. With Donald Tusk as Prime Minister, Polish-German relations are getting more Europe-centred. Cooperation is concentrated on building concrete policies based on challenges faced by the European Union and a conscious realignment of opportunities and limits of both countries. Poland has become one of Europe's (and first of all Germany's) staunch and predictable partners, focused on a strong, consistent and integrated European Union. What is more, the situation in Europe has changed radically. The Polish economy did not suffer from the crisis as heavily as other countries, mostly because of safety mechanisms built into the economic system. The crisis made Germans aware of the fact that there is a country in the east with a similar way of thinking about fiscal policy and discipline as well as economic principles. This situation has also had a deep impact on Poland's self-assessment, allowing it to revise and alter its own self-perception of a poor, provincial member of an exclusive club of wealthy nations. The crisis undermined the unfavourable division of Europe into the rich west and poor east and brought another division into attention, this time between the countries of the north and the south. In no way, however, does this make Poland a lead player in Brussels; one of the reasons being that Poland does not use the common European currency. Assuming that the situation in Poland will continue to develop as rapidly and positively as it has, it will be in Germany's interest that Poland joins the euro zone as quickly as possible, which would also benefit Poland in the long run. Although Poland still has a lower economic and political potential than Germany, it has become a stable, reliable and cooperative partner ready to search for new solutions to Europe's problems. The EU, meanwhile, is still facing a significant number of such problems. The crisis is not limited to Greece, saving the euro or finding ideas for new institutions. The crisis is, first and foremost, a matter of seeking out new mechanisms enabling economic growth. To this we have to add the events occurring in the EU's immediate southern and eastern neighbourhood, which cannot be ignored as factors in European security and economical cooperation, especially because of their drive towards democratisation. There are a few important challenges for Polish-German cooperation in foreign, defence and European neighbourhood policy. These are: Russia and its will to modernise, the internal reforms going on in the countries of the Eastern Partnership, the revolutions in Africa and the USA’s progressive withdrawal from our region. In the face of these global challenges, the limited post-crisis budgets of the EU countries are a chance to fight national egoisms and have a positive impact on further integration and, as a consequence, on a new Polish-German partnership. Both countries have a special awareness of having the most to lose when it comes to security and economic growth if the EU decides to forsake further pro-integration actions.
Poland and Germany as seen by their neighbours
Traditionally, Polish-German cooperation has been focused on eastern Europe, i.e. Russia and the Eastern Partnership. The interest in the region shared by both countries is mostly a result of their geopolitics. Both Poland and Germany, with their transformation experiences, would make ideal partners in joint actions aimed at modernisation and democratisation of eastern and southern EU neighbours. Indeed, this is the area in which both countries cooperate in the most effective way, both in building up civil society and economic cooperation with members of the Eastern Partnership. Getting rid of ideology in the relations between Poland and Russia also had a big impact on the quality of political talks and joint ideas for a partnership aimed at modernisation. Cooperation between Poland and Germany in building the EU's relations with Russia is important. Although both countries have broadly divergent economic, technological and political potentials and are differently perceived by Russia, their joint actions make Russia aware that the EU constitutes a whole and cannot be easily divided (contrary to what Russia has attempted in its foreign policy). Both Germany and Poland ought to keep in mind the well-grounded facts about Russia’s development when constructing their policy towards this country. That the meaning of modernisation is today viewed differently by the EU and Russia is not a secret. Russia sees the transfer of new technologies and an increase in foreign investments as important, whereas the EU focuses on democratisation, development of civil society, combating corruption and bureaucracy as well as reforms of economic law and a better climate for investments. Germany's decision to withdraw from nuclear energy will have a vital impact on building a common EU policy regarding Russia. Germany has no other way but to intensify its cooperation and dependency on Russian natural resources. And although chancellor Merkel was sceptical towards Gazprom's proposal to build a third pipeline on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, energy companies from Germany and Russia will surely tighten their cooperation. To this we should add an intense cooperation between Germany and Russia considering not only energy issues, but mostly rare earth elements, which provide German companies with vital elements for high-tech production.
Thus, there exists a real danger that a partnership project aimed at European modernisation will turn into a resource partnership between Germany and Russia and negatively impact relations between Poland and Germany.
This aspect is closely related to energy politics, which will surely be a trial for a Polish-German partnership. While the German government is withdrawing from nuclear energy, tightening resource cooperation with Russia and investing in clean energy, Poland wants to build its energy safety and economic development on nuclear and coal energy and shale gas. Thus far no conflicts have arisen, but they are inevitable. It seems that Poland and Germany have a different model of economic growth, which is not yet a topic for discussion between the countries.
The Weimar Triangle has again become an important forum for exchange of ideas and creating joint strategies, in particular when it comes to foreign policy and defence. Poland, Germany and France have realised that in times of constrained military defence budgets, close cooperation is a necessity. This is the origin of the plan to improve the civilian and military crisis management capabilities of the European Union, mostly by implementing a broad joint approach to planning and carrying out civilian missions, military operations and joint civilian-military missions on the strategic and operational level and the development of rapid reaction forces.
New (necessary) areas for joint Polish-German action
Most importantly, Poland is slowly leaving its traditional fields of interest in its thinking about European politics and Polish-German dialogue. Some examples are the above-mentioned policies of security, energy and the approach towards the eastern neighbours. Poland will (have to) improve its activity in finance and the economy, which would make it an even more attractive partner for Berlin. And Poland really needs Germany's support in negotiating the new budget, but even more in European cohesion and agricultural policy, although the interests of both countries are not at all convergent.
Despite having numerous common interests, as well as different views on particular challenges facing the EU, Polish-German relations have a very solid footing. This has become possible thanks to good relations between Prime Minister Tusk and Chancellor Merkel, as well as the pragmatic European policy pursued by both countries. Current relations between Poland and Germany are characterised by an efficient management of problems that the EU has to face. Nonetheless, one cannot risk saying that Poland and Germany are the EU's motive force, because in the dialogue between the two countries there is yet no place for brave new concepts of European development. But the Polish-German partnership is nowadays concrete, pragmatic and most of all very dynamic. In areas of conflict, such as energy politics, climate change and partly also the EU's budget, it is necessary to establish joint groups and task forces as soon as possible. Thanks to its openness to and activities focused on Europe, Warsaw can frequently present Berlin with proposals for cooperation in the above mentioned fields and in this way, stabilise the beginning of a new partnership. The situation favours Poland: the country is becoming an increasingly active and important player in Brussels, with its coalition ability improving significantly, while Germany often gives the impression of being lost in its own foreign policy. Proposed projects and declarations on the 20th anniversary of the Treaty are a good basis, but unless they are properly carried out, they will not change reality. The important issues are regular meetings and consultations on standpoints, as well as intense cooperation between institutions regarding individual topics. The most important drive of a dynamic partnership between Poland and Germany will always be trust and knowledge of the neighbour and here is still a deficit at the German side. However, chances for change are looming.
Waldemar Czachur, Ph.D., is an expert on Germany, an associate of Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych (the Centre for International Relations) in Warsaw and a researcher at the University of Warsaw. He is co-author of the book “How to talk to the Germans. About the difficulties of the German-Polish dialogue and its European challenge” („Jak rozmawiać z Niemcami. O trudnościach dialogu polsko-niemieckiego i jego europejskim wyzwaniu”. Wrocław 2009, Kazimierz Wóycicki, Waldemar Czachur).