A new report commissioned by the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), and supported by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung's EU | Global Dialogue and Washington, DC USA | Canada | Global Dialogue offices, highlights mounting concerns that international trade agreements are creating barriers to consumers’ right to repair the products they own. As everyday devices from smartphones to tractors become ever more reliant on software, restrictive clauses in free trade agreements are making it harder for consumers and independent repairers to access the tools and information they need for effective repairs.
Argentina is pushing hard to be labelled “low risk” under the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) – despite alarming deforestation in the Chaco forest and scant involvement of local communities. A new analysis by REDAF warns that the current monitoring system, driven by powerful agribusiness interests, could underestimate forest loss, overrate compliance in soy and beef production, and mask human rights abuses.
With geopolitical multipolarity reshaping space, this brief calls for a structured India–EU Space Agenda that couples market incentives with diplomatic alignment.
The EU and the UK are holding their first post-Brexit summit on 19 May. Since coming to power in July 2024, the focus of Labour’s much-vaunted ‘reset’ with the EU has been on building friendly relations with EU institutions and Member States. Whilst these overtures have been positively received, (substantive) progress has been slow. The summit will therefore be crucial in determining whether the two sides can move from ambition to action.
The new EU Böll Brief “Trading partners? Europe's options against Trump’s tariffs“ analyses the potential consequences of rising US tariffs on European trade and explores strategic responses available to the EU, highlighting the economic risks of a tariff war for each individual EU Member State and outlining alternative strategies for the EU to safeguard its economic interests.
The majority of EU Member States do not have any formal China strategy papers. Some EU Member States and specific government ministries have adopted internal China strategies and guidelines that have not been officially released to the public. Commonly referred to as ‘China strategies’, these documents outline national positions on China, rather than concrete strategies for managing bilateral relations. Jacob Mardell mapped out the state of play of these strategies in EU27, UK and Switzerland.
Will the EU-US Trade and Technology Council shape a resilient future or succumb to geopolitical rifts? This in-depth exploration of scenarios, challenges, and opportunities for transatlantic collaboration on trade, tech, and climate action outlines possible futures.
Jacob Mardell compares the US and EU strategies to ensure access to raw materials necessary for the green transition in the face of global competition and shows how these should be based on genuine and inclusive partnerships rather than just economic interests.
The majority of EU Member States do not have any formal China strategy papers. Some EU Member States and specific government ministries have adopted internal China strategies and guidelines that have not been officially released to the public. Commonly referred to as ‘China strategies’, these documents outline national positions on China, rather than concrete strategies for managing bilateral relations. Jacob Mardell mapped out the state of play of these strategies in EU27, UK and Switzerland.
Populism, nationalism, and an intensifying rivalry between the United States and China are testing the cooperation within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As its 10 member States battle the effects of Covid-19 amid political and territorial crises, the group has struggled to overcome internal differences and address profound external challenges.
Turkey and multilateral institutions alike, including the European Union, were already struggling with political and economic crises in the years before the pandemic multiplied the sense of catastrophe. As they seek to pull themselves out of the depths of Covid-19, it is time to set aside the divisions that have long stalled progress for all of them, and seek recovery in cooperation and mutual benefit.
Major multilateral institutions have long claimed that their market-oriented trade rules reduce poverty and advance development. Instead, they hold back the developing world from a more human-centric, social-justice approach that it needs to reach its potential. South Africa has the potential to set an example of how a global “middle power” can drive change. The Covid-19 pandemic has provided extra impetus – and a test.
The need for cross-border data sharing throughout the Covid-19 pandemic has shown that the future of multilateral threat management will hinge on steady yet flexible open-data publishing norms and multilateral data-transfer agreements. In many ways, India typifies the perspectives and needs of emerging economies related to data sharing, data flows, and related commercial regulation.
Georgia remains a developing country even three decades after its independence from the Soviet Union and despite its strategic location and abundant natural resources. It has benefited to a limited extent from foreign investment and relatively recent free-trade agreements with the EU and China. But its full emergence as an economically and politically resilient State has been hampered by modernization driven development agenda and neoliberal policies with too little regard for their social and environmental impacts in Georgia, as well as highpressure, counter-productive trade- and lending policies imposed by global powers such as the IMF, the EU, the United States, and China.
Trade agreements have become an important battleground for tech companies to fight the regulatory pressure they are finally facing in the Global North. But allowing tech companies to capture digital trade talks to defang domestic regulation creates serious risks for privacy, fundamental rights, competition, social and economic justice, and sustainable development.
This scoping paper compiled by focuses on the potential risks for the EU from enshrining rights for Chinese investors in Europe in an inter-national investment treaty. It emphasises these “defensive” interests, because investment treaties by their very nature restrict the ability of a state to regulate or even restrict foreign investment.
While several key elements of the procurement chapter of the EU-Mercosur agreement have either not been negotiated or have not yet been made public, what has been released has the potential to undermine fair and sustainable development programs throughout the Mercosur countries.
Provisions in the EU-Mercosur FTA conflict with ambitious climate action. If enacted, the agreement would result in an increase in EU imports of primary agricultural commodities from a region critical for maintaining global biodiversity and regulating climate.
The EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is designed to increase the flow of goods among countries. In addition to reducing tariffs and quotas on meat and other goods, it includes measures to streamline food safety approvals in ways that could result in lower standards.
